‘The Ordinary Diet of the Law’: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court by Young, Ernest A.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094517
253
 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
978-0-226-36256-4/2012/2011-0007$10.00
ERNEST A. YOUNG
“THE ORDINARY DIET OF THE LAW” :
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PREEMPTION IN THE ROBERTS COURT
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided a quiet little case about
whether the beneﬁciary rules of a pension plan established under
the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act1 (ERISA)
trumped a Washington statute providing that designation of a
spouse as a beneﬁciary of a nonprobate asset was automatically
revoked upon divorce.2 The majority held that it did. In dissent,
Justice Breyer stepped back for a moment to discuss the broader
importance of statutory preemption cases for federalism. He
stressed “the practical importance of preserving local independence,
at retail, that is, by applying pre-emption analysis with care, statute
by statute, line by line, in order to determine how best to reconcile
a federal statute’s language and purpose with federalism’s need to
preserve state autonomy.”3 This task, Breyer suggested, is more
consequential for federalism than “the occasional constitutional ef-
Ernest A. Young is Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School.
Author’s note: I am grateful to Erin Blondel, Dennis Hutchinson, and Maggie Lemos
for helpful comments on the manuscript and to Kate Dickinson-Varner for excellent
research assistance. I am also indebted to the many lawyers and scholars that I have worked
with on preemption-related projects over the years, especially Erin Busby, Brendan Crim-
mins, Melissa Davis, David Frederick, Michael Greve, and Garrick Pursley.
1 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
2 Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 532 US 141 (2001).
3 Id at 160 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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fort to trim Congress’ commerce power at its edges”4 or “to protect
a State’s treasury from a private damages action.”5 He concluded
that “in today’s world, ﬁlled with legal complexity, the true test of
federalist principle may lie . . . in those many statutory cases where
courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet
of the law.”6
Justice Breyer’s observation—condemned to the hopeless obscu-
rity of an ERISA case—is the most important statement that the
Supreme Court has made about federalism in a very long time. It
speaks to the needs of federalism doctrine in the post-New Deal
era, which largely views the national government and the states as
exercising concurrent powers. Despite occasional relapses in partic-
ular doctrinal areas, we have generally given up on the old regime
of “dual federalism,” which required the courts to identify and police
the boundaries of separate and exclusive spheres of national and
state authority.7 Nowadays, Congress’s afﬁrmative commerce au-
thority is extremely broad, and the negative or dormant Commerce
Clause that once forbade state regulation of the interstate market
has become a nondiscrimination principle rather than a jurisdic-
tional restraint. In this world of concurrent jurisdiction, “the key
task of federalism is to manage the overlap of state and federal law.”8
The doctrine of preemption, grounded in the Supremacy Clause
rather than in Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers,
is the key instrument by which the law manages this overlap.
So it is that while cases about the reach of the Commerce Clause
or the scope of state sovereign immunity grab the headlines, pre-
emption cases make up the functional heart of the Court’s feder-
alism doctrine. As Garrick Pursley has observed, “preemption may
be the most important issue for modern federalism theory because
it reallocates regulatory authority between the national and state
4 Id, citing United States v Morrison 529 US 598 (2000) (striking down part of the federal
Violence Against Women Act as outside Congress’s commerce power).
5 Egelhoff, 532 US at 160–61, citing Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v
Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001) (holding that state sovereign immunity barred damages suits
against a state government under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
6 Egelhoff, 532 US at 160–61, citing AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US 366,
427 (1999) (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va L Rev 1 (1950)
(describing the old dual federalist regime and observing its evaporation after 1937).
8 Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in William W. Buzbee, ed, Preemption
Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question 33, 42 (Cambridge, 2009).
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governments.”9 Some of the most important federalism choices that
Congress and executive actors make have to do not so much with
the scope of federal regulation, but rather with the extent to which
that regulation will displace state law. As Professor Pursley explains,
“[p]reemption . . . shapes the regulatory environment for most major
industries—drugs and medical devices, tobacco, banking, air trans-
portation, securities, cars, and boats[,] to name a few,” and it “de-
termines the diversity, scope, and delivery of a wide variety of im-
portant government services to citizens”; as a result, “it is the issue
of constitutional law that most directly impacts everyday life.”10
Preemption cases have been strikingly numerous on the Roberts
Court’s docket, if not always high proﬁle. Last Term, the Court
decided ﬁve—count ’em—ﬁve preemption cases. Moreover, while
preemption scholars (including this one) once lamented the Court’s
failure to see preemption as a coherent area of doctrine—as opposed
to simply seeing these cases as raising issues about particular federal
statutory schemes—the Court does increasingly seem to see pre-
emption cases as raising a common set of issues deserving at least
somewhat uniﬁed treatment.
In this essay, I assess the current state of the Roberts Court’s
preemption jurisprudence, situate it within the broader context of
constitutional federalism doctrine, and hazard some guesses about
where the Court may be headed. Most observers consider the law
in this area to be, in the words of a leading practitioner, “a mud-
dle.”11 Part of my descriptive purpose here is to suggest that the
admittedly divergent results and approaches in the Court’s pre-
emption cases do not generally stem from confusion, incompetence,
or the subordination of legal principle to result-oriented prefer-
ences. They reﬂect, instead, the fact that any overarching framework
of preemption principles must be applied to interpret a range of
quite diverse statutory regimes, including many in which courts
must share interpretive duties with federal agencies. Congress’s pre-
emptive intent, in other words, varies by context, and courts faithful
to interpreting that intent will thus produce varying results from
one context to another. Moreover, even though the Justices are
beginning to develop broadly principled frameworks for deciding
9 Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 Ohio St L J 511, 513 (2010).
10 Id at 513–14.
11 Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 Tulane L
Rev 1257, 1257 (2010).
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preemption cases, the different methodological commitments held
by individual Justices have thus far prevented the Court from co-
alescing around a single theory. Textualists approach these cases
differently from purposivists, and Justices willing to defer to ad-
ministrative agencies will embrace distinct approaches from those
who view the agencies with more skepticism. Without denying that
preemption is a muddle, I hope to make the case that this muddle
is fundamentally faithful to the statutory and methodological com-
plexity that this area of the law presents.
That said, my normative project is to urge that preemption doc-
trine should align more closely to the broader imperatives of con-
stitutional federalism doctrine in the post-New Deal era. Those
imperatives, as I see them, can be captured in three broad propo-
sitions: First, national and state authority is largely concurrent, not
limited by exclusive subject-matter spheres. Second, the limits of
national authority stem primarily (although not exclusively) from
the representation of the states in Congress and the Constitution’s
rigorous procedural constraints on federal lawmaking. And, third,
it follows that the courts’ role in protecting federalism should focus
on facilitating and enhancing the operation of these political and
procedural checks on national authority. These imperatives high-
light the critical importance of the “presumption against preemp-
tion” developed in Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp.12 and similar cases.
My doctrinal focus here is thus to defend that presumption against
its most prominent critics and to suggest how it might be applied
more effectively going forward. I also suggest that tying preemption
doctrine more ﬁrmly to the broader imperatives of federalism might
help the Court transcend its current, more overtly political divisions
over tort reform, aggregate litigation, immigration policy, and sim-
ilar issues.
The analysis has four parts. Part I places preemption within its
broader constitutional context, tracing the development of pre-
emption doctrine alongside more general changes in the consti-
tutional law of federalism. Part II then surveys the Court’s ﬁve
preemption cases decided in the 2010 Term. Although these cases
cannot be said to present a coherent set of preemption principles,
they do provide a window into the Court’s evolving thinking on
the underlying controversies of preemption doctrine. Part III fo-
12 331 US 218 (1947).
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cuses on the debate concerning the legitimacy and scope of Rice’s
anti-preemption presumption and underlying arguments about the
original understanding of the Supremacy Clause. Part IV concludes
with some comments on the politics of preemption in the Roberts
Court.
I. Preemption Doctrine in Constitutional Context
It is only in the last few years that preemption cases have
been considered constitutional cases at all. Although a preempted
state law is technically unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause, the cases are generally exercises in statutory construction.
But the construction of federal statutes plays a critical role in our
federal structure. Our founding document sketches only the barest
outlines of our federalism, leaving the rest to be worked out through
statutes, judicial decisions, executive branch regulations, and gov-
ernmental practices.13 Preemption cases thus signiﬁcantly shape our
federal balance, and preemption doctrine has been critically inﬂu-
enced by broader changes in constitutional law.
a. from dual federalism to concurrent jurisdiction
For most of our history, federalism has been about drawing lines.
For a century and a half between the Founding and the New Deal,
judges, politicians, and scholars all understood the Constitution
to mandate “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting ﬁelds of
power—that of the national government and of the States. The
two authorities confront[ed] each other as equals across a precise
constitutional line, deﬁning their respective jurisdictions.”14 In this
world of “dual federalism,” challenges to state or federal measures
required judges to determine whether the right government was
acting within the right sphere: States were prohibited from acting
on matters that were “in their nature national, or admit only of
one uniform system,”15 and the national government was fore-
13 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L
J 408 (2007).
14 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in Valerie A. Earle, ed, Federalism:
Inﬁnite Variety in Theory and Practice 8, 24–25 (1968); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Fed-
eralism 183 (Aspen, 2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands federal and state
governments to operate in different spheres of authority.”).
15 Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 US (12 How) 299, 319 (1852).
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closed from regulating matters “essentially local.”16 Legislative and
executive actors confronted similar choices: President Herbert
Hoover, for example, rejected broad national action to ameliorate
the effects of the Depression not because he was opposed to gov-
ernment economic intervention, but rather because he viewed it
as predominantly a state responsibility.17
In practice, dual federalism was not always categorical. In Cooley
v Board of Wardens, for instance, the Court distinguished between
matters within Congress’s commerce power, which required uni-
form national regulation and therefore excluded the states, and
other matters that might be regulated by the states unless and
until Congress chose to act.18 The categories seemed to harden
by the end of the nineteenth century.19 In any event, dual feder-
alism put a premium on line-drawing, and as the economy became
more integrated and governments intervened in the market more
frequently, the lines became increasingly difﬁcult to draw.
The problem was not simply that the Court needed to know
where to draw the lines, but also that the lines drawn needed to
appear determinate—to be the product of objective “judgment”
rather than judicial “will.”20 As conﬂict intensiﬁed over the reach
of the New Deal into traditional spheres of state regulation, pro-
ponents of broader national authority pointed to plausible dis-
agreements about the boundaries of national power as evidence
that the Court was simply striking down laws that it opposed on
policy grounds. President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, cited
dissenting opinions in cases striking down New Deal legislation
16 See id at 326 (Daniel, J, concurring in judgment); see also United States v E. C. Knight
Co., 156 US 1, 13–14 (1895) (rejecting national power to regulate local activities that
affect interstate commerce).
17 See, e.g., William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists,
and American Economic Policy, 1921–1933 98–99 (Cambridge, 1988) (observing that “Hoo-
ver insisted that no American should be allowed to go hungry or cold,” but he believed
that “[c]are for the needy was properly the responsibility of private organizations and of
state and local ofﬁcials”).
18 53 US at 319.
19 See E. C. Knight Co., 156 US at 11 (“[T]he power of a State to protect the lives,
health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals
. . . is a power originally and always belonging to the States . . . and essentially exclusive.
. . . On the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
States is also exclusive.”).
20 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 521, 522–23 (Wes-
leyan, 1961); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1733, 1836–40 (2005) (discussing
the judiciary’s institutional need to decide according to determinate rules).
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to say that “there is no basis for the claim made by some members
of the Court that something in the Constitution has compelled
them regretfully to thwart the will of the people.”21 Larry Lessig
has thus argued that the indeterminacy problem ultimately helped
undermine the legitimacy of the Court’s stand against the New
Deal.22 After the Court’s famous “switch in time” in 1937, it never
again sought to draw such restrictive boundaries on national
power, and it also signiﬁcantly dialed back the rigor of its “dor-
mant” Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation.23
After the switch in time, the Court’s federalism doctrine has
generally abandoned dual federalism’s notion of separate spheres
in favor of a regime of concurrent jurisdiction.24 The Court’s new
cases broadened Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to reach
all activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce, and
the Court expanded this category to include activities that were
small in themselves but, in the aggregate, had substantial economic
effects.25 A national regulatory power this broad, however, could
no longer be exclusive without wiping out virtually all state reg-
ulatory authority. Hence the Court shifted its dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence from a rule categorically excluding state reg-
ulation wherever federal power could reach to a more modest
antidiscrimination principle.26 This meant that both state and na-
tional authorities have power to address most subjects of regu-
latory concern.
21 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary, March
9, 1937, online at http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat9.html (concluding that “[i]n the face of
such dissenting opinions, it is perfectly clear that, as Chief Justice Hughes has said, ‘We
are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is’”).
22 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Supreme
Court Review 125, 176–80 (“[T]he retreat of the ‘Old Court’ tracks the collapse of what
made it possible for the Court to sustain [formal legal distinctions] in the name of trans-
lating federalism. The formalisms themselves had been rendered political. They now
seemed more the result of extra-judicial judgments than entailed by the legal material.”).
23 See Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitu-
tionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U Chi L Rev 483 (1997) (explaining how
the New Deal revolution expanded the regulatory authority of both federal and state
governments).
24 See Corwin, 36 Va L Rev at 17–23 (cited in note 7) (“According to [the post-New
Deal] conception, the National Government and the States are mutually complementary
parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended to realize the
current purposes of government according to their applicability to the problem in hand.”).
25 See Wickard, 317 US at 127–28.
26 See, for example, City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 624 (1978) (stating
that “[t]he crucial inquiry” is “whether [the state law] is basically a protectionist measure”).
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Vestiges of dual federalism remain. The Court often suggests
that foreign relations is an exclusively federal ﬁeld27—notwith-
standing the myriad state activities that daily affect foreign rela-
tions and the inherent difﬁculty of drawing lines between “foreign”
and “interstate” commerce in a globalized economy.28 The Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence still forbids in princi-
ple—but only infrequently strikes down in practice—state actions
that impose an excessive “burden” on interstate commerce, even
absent discrimination against out-of-staters.29 Since all economic
regulation burdens commerce to some extent, this vestigial doc-
trine suggests that state regulation of interstate activity is somehow
suspect. The Court’s “intergovernmental immunity” jurispru-
dence likewise rests on dual-federalist premises,30 although that
doctrine has been narrowed signiﬁcantly since the New Deal.31
And the Court occasionally speaks in dual federalist terms in its
afﬁrmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, suggesting that fed-
eral legislation is constitutionally suspect where it intrudes into
areas of “traditional state regulation.”32 The confusion and criti-
cism that each of these remnants has engendered,33 however, tends
27 See, for example, Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429 (1968) (asserting that any state action
that interferes with U.S. foreign relations is unconstitutional). For contemporary examples,
see American Insurance Assn. v Garamendi, 537 US 1100 (2003) (holding state law preempted
by implication from an executive agreement without any congressional action); Crosby v
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000) (ﬁnding preemption by federal statute
more readily where foreign relations are at issue).
28 See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 Geo Wash L Rev 139, 178 (2001); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign
Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617, 1670–80 (1997).
29 See, for example, Kassel v Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 US 662
(1981) (striking down an Iowa law regulating the length of trucks); Pike v Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 US 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local beneﬁts.”).
30 See Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-33 at 1221–22 n 4 (3d ed
2000).
31 Compare Penn Dairies, Inc. v Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 US 261,
270–71 (1943) (acknowledging that intergovernmental immunity doctrine must recognize
the concurrent authority of state regulators), with Hancock v Train, 426 US 167 (1976)
(continuing to state the doctrine in broad terms).
32 See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567–68 (1995) (insisting on the need to preserve
“a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”); see also id at 580
(Kennedy, J, concurring) (“[W]e must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks
to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern.”).
33 See, for example, Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly
Local”: Customary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 Duke L J (forth-
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to conﬁrm that the law of federalism has generally moved on to
a concurrent model.
b. from judicial enforcement to political and procedural
safeguards
The shift from dual federalism to concurrent state and national
jurisdiction coincided with two additional changes in how we think
about the division of authority between the state and national
governments. Although it seems fair to say that these changes
began in the New Deal period, they were not acknowledged by
the Court until much later—primarily in its 1985 decision in Gar-
cia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.34 The ﬁrst change
was from a federalism deﬁned by hard jurisdictional boundaries
to one maintained by political competition. Without dual feder-
alism’s sharp limits on Congress’s power, state authority is main-
tained by a variety of political dynamics, including states’ repre-
sentation in Congress, underlying attachments of citizens to the
state governments, bureaucratic resistance by state ofﬁcials
charged with implementing federal law, and federal governmental
inertia induced by onerous constitutional procedures for making
federal law.35 Federalism becomes not so much a matter of drawing
lines as one of calibrating incentives, enforcing procedural rules,
and interpreting the output of the national political process in a
way that respects the system’s structural safeguards for states.
The second and related change concerned the role of the courts
in enforcing federalism. As the post-New Deal Court largely gave
up review of national legislation under the Commerce Clause and
transformed its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence into a
nondiscrimination principle, “the courts no longer played a central
role in managing the relationship of the states and the federal
government,” and, in particular, “became much less active in pa-
coming 2012) (criticizing the effort to identify traditional subjects of state regulation as
“indeterminate and thus unworkable”).
34 469 US 528 (1985).
35 See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Ro¨le of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543
(1954) (political representation); Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism,
68 Ohio St L J 1669 (2007) (popular attachments); Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L J 1256 (2009) (bureaucratic resistance);
Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1681
(2008) (procedural safeguards).
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trolling the bounds of federal power.”36 The Court articulated the
reasons for its retreat in Garcia, where it said that the Constitu-
tion’s protection for federalism lies primarily in the states’ rep-
resentation in Congress—not in judicially enforceable boundaries
for national power.37 Consequently, as Herbert Wechsler argued,
“the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation
of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states,
whose representatives control the legislative process and, by hy-
pothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged
Act of Congress.”38 Although many observers viewed Garcia as an
abdication of any judicial enforcement of limits on national power,
it is better viewed as a shift from efforts to impose substantive
limitations on national power to a focus on process.39
Preemption takes on particular importance in light of these
shifts in our theory of federalism and the role of the courts. One
reason has to do with the impact of preemption on a federal bal-
ance that is determined primarily by politics. Garcia built upon
James Madison’s much older theory of federalism as a competition
between the national government and the states for the loyalty of
their mutual citizens.40 Notwithstanding the jurisdictional limi-
tations that the Constitution placed on national power, Madison
understood that the ultimate balance would be determined by
politics—that is, by which level of government could best earn
the electorate’s trust by providing government services and ben-
36 Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony at 40 (cited in note 8).
37 See 469 US at 550–51.
38 Wechsler, 54 Colum L Rev at 559 (cited in note 35). This “political safeguards” thesis
is highly contested. See, for example, Garcia, 469 US at 574 n 17 (Powell, J, dissenting);
Saikrishna B. Prakash and John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 Tex L Rev 1459 (2001); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 Vill L Rev 951 (2001).
39 Compare William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich L Rev
1709, 1720 (1985) (seeing Garcia as the end of judicial enforcement of federalism) with
Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill L Rev 1349, 1361–64 (2001)
(ﬁnding a silver lining). To say that a “process federalism” model based on Garcia can
actually go a long way toward promoting state autonomy is emphatically not to concede
that substantive limits on national power are unnecessary or undesirable.
40 See Federalist 45, 46 (Madison), in The Federalist at 308–23 (cited in note 20) (arguing
that federal encroachment “will be easily defeated by the State Governments[,] who will
be supported by the people”); see generally Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s
Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 Vand L Rev 329 (2003) (discussing Mad-
ison’s theory).
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eﬁcial regulation.41 He thought the states would always have an
advantage in this competition, however, because “[t]he powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the objects, which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.”42 The “political safeguards of federalism,”
in other words, depend on the states retaining important regu-
latory responsibilities and government functions that touch the
daily lives of their citizens.43
Preemption, however, has the potential to alter these vital dy-
namics. As Garrick Pursley summarizes the argument, “[c]on-
stricting state regulatory authority reduces states’ capacity to pro-
vide beneﬁts to their citizens, which in turn diminishes states’
effectiveness at checking national expansionism in the political
process—a critical prerequisite for a functioning set of ‘political
process’ safeguards for federalism.”44 Under dual federalism, pre-
emption of state authority within areas delegated to national con-
trol could not unbalance the system, because the states retained
their own realm of exclusive authority in which they could provide
41 Federalist 46 (Madison), in The Federalist at 315–16 (cited in note 20). Madison
reminded his readers that because “the ultimate authority . . . resides in the people alone,”
the question whether the states or the national government “will be able to enlarge its
sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other” would ultimately “depend on the sen-
timents and sanction of their common constituents.” Id. Madison’s principle that gov-
ernments compete by offering services and regulations to their constituents anticipated
the contemporary economic theory of regulation. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation
of Federalism, 76 Va L Rev 265 (1990).
42 Federalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist at 292–93 (cited in note 20). Hamilton
similarly observed that because state governments “regulate all those personal interests
and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake,”
the states are assured of possessing the “affection, esteem and reverence” of their citizens.
Federalist 17 (Hamilton), in The Federalist at 107 (cited in note 20).
43 I have developed this argument at greater length elsewhere. See generally Young, 46
Vill L Rev at 1349 (cited in note 39), and Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and
the Future of Federalism, 1999 Supreme Court Review 1, 43–47.
44 Pursley, 71 Ohio St L J at 513 (cited in note 9). See also Ernest A. Young, Federal
Preemption and State Autonomy, in Richard A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve, eds, Federal
Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests 249, 252–54 (2007); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 Supreme Court
Review 341, 404 (“[T]he vitality of the participatory state institutions depends in part on
the types of substantive decisions that are left for the states. Should the federal government
preempt them from most ﬁelds that touch directly on the life of local communities, the
states would become but empty shells within which no meaningful political activity could
take place.”).
264 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2011
government services and beneﬁcial regulation to their citizens.45
Preemption must be cabined more carefully, however, in a con-
current world where preemptive federal action threatens to cut
off state access to the wellsprings of popular support.
Preemption’s potential to undermine the structural safeguards
of federalism also highlights the need for courts to play an in-
dependent role in this area. Our federalism has always relied on
the courts to umpire the tug-of-war between national and state
authority,46 and while the nature of the courts’ role has changed,
its importance has not. Moreover, it has become clear that Garcia’s
“process federalism”—that is, a constitutional model relying on
the states’ representation in the legislative process rather than on
substantive limitations on national legislation—did leave a role for
courts.47 But that role consists in a John Hart Ely-esque form of
“representation reinforcement”48—not the substantive line-draw-
ing that prevailed under dual federalism.49 Garcia said that the
states’ primary protection was “one of process rather than one of
result,”50 suggesting that judicial review should focus on ensuring
that the political process did in fact operate to protect states’
interests.
As the next section demonstrates, preemption doctrine ﬁts read-
ily within this process paradigm. In a world of concurrent power,
federal legislation will frequently determine the actual allocation
of responsibility between the federal and state authorities, and the
courts are frequently called upon to interpret the allocation that
45 Indeed, courts frequently invalidated state governmental activity within federal
spheres, even in the absence of congressional action, under the dormant Commerce Clause
and similar doctrines. See, for example, Brown v Maryland, 25 US (12 Wheat) 419 (1827).
46 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S Cal L Rev 1311 (1997);
Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1753 (cited in note 20) (noting that the Supreme Court
has intervened to maintain balance in our federal system throughout our history); see also
Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Gonzales
v Raich, No 03-1454, *9–10 (US ﬁled Oct 13, 2004) (collecting examples of other federal
systems that rely on judicial review to resolve conﬂicts between subnational units and the
central authority).
47 See, for example, Rapaczynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 361 (cited in note 44)
(“[T]he decision proposes to rely primarily on the political safeguards of federalism and
to ground any future judicial intervention not in a defense of state sovereignty but in the
idea of compensating for possible failings in the national political process.” (footnote
omitted)); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex L Rev 1, 118–
21 (2004) (discussing the process federalism strategies employed by the Rehnquist Court).
48 See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
49 See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 15–16 (cited in note 47).
50 469 US at 554.
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Congress has established. Preemption cases are the most signiﬁ-
cant category of these disputes, and the frequent ambiguities in
Congress’s preemptive intent afford the courts an opportunity to
be more than just a mouthpiece for federal authority. As the next
section recounts, the Court has developed doctrines for resolving
preemption cases—in particular, the Court’s “presumption against
preemption” exempliﬁed in Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp.51—that
ﬁt well within Garcia’s vision of process federalism. By requiring
Congress to speak clearly in order to preempt state law, Rice en-
sures notice to legislative advocates of state interest that preemp-
tion is contemplated in proposed legislation, and it imposes an
additional procedural hurdle to legislation that undermines state
prerogatives.52 Like other “clear statement rules” disfavoring leg-
islation that alters the federal-state balance,53 the Rice presumption
operationalizes the political and procedural safeguards of feder-
alism.54
c. the development of the rice presumption
Stephen Gardbaum has written that “[t]he United States Su-
preme Court did not clearly and unequivocally recognize a con-
gressional power of preemption until the beginning of the twen-
tieth century.”55 In the nineteenth century, most cases that might
raise preemption issues today would have been decided under the
doctrine of dual federalism—that is, by determining whether a
51 331 US 218 (1947).
52 See Young, 46 Vill L Rev at 1385 (cited in note 49); see also David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 NYU L Rev 921, 944 (1992) (observing
that interpretive canons disfavoring various kinds of change “increase the likelihood that
a statute will not change existing arrangements and understandings unless the legislature—
the politically accountable body—has faced the problem and decided that change is ap-
propriate”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and
the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L J 2, 40 (2008) (noting
“that judicial demands for a clear congressional statement . . . can serve to increase
legislative enactment costs for constitutionally problematic policies”).
53 See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991). For overviews of the debate
about clear statement rules and their role in federalism doctrine, see William N. Eskridge
Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593 (1992); Ernest A. Young, The Story of Gregory v. Ashcroft:
Clear Statement Rules and the Statutory Constitution of American Federalism, in William N.
Eskridge Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, eds, Statutory Interpretation Stories
(Foundation, 2011).
54 See, for example, Young, The Story of Gregory v. Ashcroft at 196 (cited in note 53).
55 Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L Rev 767, 787 (1994).
See also Lessig, 1995 Supreme Court Review at 166 (cited in note 22).
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given exertion of regulatory authority fell within an area delegated
to federal authority or the sphere reserved to the states.56 The
Court did recognize limited areas of concurrent authority, and in
these areas federal law trumped state law in the event of a conﬂict,
but these cases arose relatively infrequently.57 As federal regulatory
activity increased toward the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, the situation became more confused and pressure mounted
to develop a coherent doctrine of preemption.58
The Court’s ﬁrst resolution of the matter was to establish a
regime of automatic ﬁeld preemption. As Professor Gardbaum
explains, the Court applied a rule of “latent exclusivity” under
which “preemption was an automatic consequence of congres-
sional action in a given ﬁeld.”59 In Chicago, Rock Island & Paciﬁc
Railway Co. v Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co.,60 for example, the
Court held that the federal Hepburn Act preempted state regu-
lation of the delivery of interstate railroad cars. Chief Justice
White argued that “it must follow in consequence of [the Hepburn
Act] that the power of the State over the subject-matter ceased to
exist from the moment that Congress exerted its paramount and
all embracing authority over the subject. We say this because the
elementary and long settled doctrine is that there can be no divided
authority over interstate commerce and that the regulations of
Congress on that subject are supreme.”61
Some of the initial decisions laying out this position, like South-
ern Railway v Reid,62 relied on actual conﬂict between state and
federal law as an alternative ground. It did not take the Court
long to make clear, however, that such conﬂicts were unnecessary.
By 1915, Justice Holmes could dismiss arguments that there was
56 See Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 785–86 (cited in note 55).
57 Id. Professor Gardbaum’s account deﬁnes this species of preemption—federal law
trumping state law in the event of a conﬂict—as “supremacy” and sharply distinguishes
it from preemption, which he takes to mean federal ouster of even nonconﬂicting state
law. See id at 771 (“Preemption . . . means (a) that states are deprived of their power to
act at all in a given area, and (b) that this is so whether or not state law is in conﬂict with
federal law.”).
58 See id at 795–800.
59 Id at 801.
60 226 US 426 (1913).
61 Id at 435. As Professor Gardbaum demonstrates, this principle was not in fact “long
settled” but rather new law. See Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 804–05 (cited in note
55).
62 222 US 424 (1912).
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no actual conﬂict between state and federal law as “immaterial”:
“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con-
gress has seen ﬁt to go.”63
During and after the New Deal, however, the Court changed
course. In 1933, Mintz v Baldwin64 rejected an argument that the
federal Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts preempted state efforts
to deal with the same problem. Justice Butler wrote that “[t]he
purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action against
the ravages of the disease is not lightly to be inferred. The in-
tention so to do must deﬁnitely and clearly appear.”65 Rice v Santa
Fe Elevator Corp.,66 which Professor Gardbaum describes as “the
locus classicus of modern preemption doctrine,”67 followed fourteen
years later, on the other side of the Court’s 1937 switch in time.
The Court’s narrowing of federal law’s preemptive force in Mintz,
Rice, and similar cases may seem inconsistent with its expansion
of federal power in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.68 and
Wickard v Filburn,69 which it decided at roughly the same time.
As Gardbaum explains, however, the two developments actually
went hand-in-hand:
In this context of a revolutionary extension of federal legislative com-
petence, the consequence of the preexisting preemption doctrine (es-
tablished while there were still signiﬁcant areas of exclusive state ju-
risdiction) would have been to threaten vast areas of state regulation
of seemingly local matters with extinction. Instead, the new constitu-
tional strategy replaced a strict division of powers version of federalism
63 Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v Varnville, 237 US 597 (1915). See also
Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 805 (cited in note 55) (concluding, under prevailing
doctrine in this period, “preemption eliminates the need to consider the content of state
laws on the subject, to lay the two laws side by side to ascertain whether or not they
conﬂict”).
64 289 US 346 (1933).
65 Id at 350.
66 331 US 218 (1947).
67 Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 807 (cited in note 55); see also Richard A. Epstein
and Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine and Its Limits, in Epstein and Greve,
eds, Federal Preemption 309, 315 (cited in 44) (agreeing that “Rice v Santa Fe Elevator by
all accounts offers the canonical statement of modern preemption doctrine”).
68 301 US 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act and reversing the
Court’s prior tendency to construe the Commerce Clause narrowly).
69 317 US 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Power extended so far as to regulate
individual growing decisions by small farmers).
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with a new version embodying the presumption that state powers,
though no longer constitutionally guaranteed, survive unless clearly
ended by Congress.70
The old presumptive preemption regime, in other words, could
only work in a world still dominated by dual federalism. The Rice
presumption translated the Supremacy Clause into the post-1937
world of concurrent power. “At a time when the exercise of the
federal power is being rapidly expanded through Congressional
action,” Justice Stone pointed out in 1941, “it is difﬁcult to over-
state the importance of safeguarding against such diminution of
state power by vague inferences as to what Congress might have
intended . . . or by reference to our own conceptions of a policy
which Congress has not expressed.”71
Indeed, the shift in the Court’s preemption jurisprudence may
have actually facilitated the expansion of Congress’s legislative
role. David Shapiro has argued that canons of interpretation that
disfavor radical change help to overcome the ordinary risk aversion
of legislators. He points out that “the danger that any loose or
vague language will be broadly interpreted to favor change over
continuity may lead the drafters of legislation to be so fearful of
the consequences of their actions (and of the political ramiﬁcations
of those actions) that the process may become too cautious.”72 If
this is right, then “the most productive relationship between courts
and legislatures may well be one of providing some reassurance
that continuity will not be inadvertently sacriﬁced, absent sufﬁ-
cient evidence of legislative purpose to do so.”73 Applied to the
speciﬁc context of preemption, Professor Shapiro’s point suggests
that courts might have eased congressional fears about intruding
on areas of traditional state regulatory authority by narrowing the
preemptive impact of new federal statutes.74
As I have already discussed, a second aspect of the post-New
Deal transformation had to do with the role and focus of judicial
70 Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 806 (cited in note 55); see also Lessig, 1995 Supreme
Court Review at 167 (cited in note 22) (“Just at the time the Court recognized the authority
of Congress to reach far more than before, it also transformed the signiﬁcance of the
statutes that Congress had passed by radically cutting back on this automatic preemption.”).
71 Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 75 (1941) (Stone, J, dissenting).
72 Shapiro, 67 NYU L Rev at 945 (cited in note 52).
73 Id.
74 By the same token, reining in the preemptive effect of federal statutes may have made
it easier for courts to accept the expansion of federal legislative authority.
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review in federalism cases. The latent exclusivity of congressional
power in pre-New Deal preemption doctrine was not a function
of congressional intent; rather, it was intrinsic to the way that
Congress’s power worked. It was, as Professor Gardbaum has ex-
plained, derived from the “paramount” nature of Congress’s power
under the Supremacy Clause.75 Early doctrine thus did not ex-
amine closely Congress’s preemptive intent in particular statutes.
Mintz and Rice, by contrast, turned the spotlight squarely on Con-
gress’s intentions concerning preemption,76 and it is now settled
doctrine that “‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’
in every pre-emption case.”77 Preemption doctrine thus ﬁts the
concurrent nature of state and federal power after the New Deal
and reﬂects the essentially political structure of federalism safe-
guards in contemporary constitutional law.78 The task of preemp-
tion doctrine, as the next section explores, is to make sure those
safeguards are honored.
d. the current doctrine and its tensions
In a concurrent world, two levels of government operate within
the same regulatory sphere, and the task of the law is to adjudicate
conﬂicts between the two authorities. As Brad Clark has observed,
“[t]o succeed, [a concurrent] system requires a means of deciding
when federal law displaces state law.”79 Two sets of questions are
particularly salient: What counts as preemption? And which in-
stitutions have the authority to preempt state law? Both issues
75 Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 801–02 (cited in note 55); see also id at 802 (“[Con-
gressional] action itself was deemed to have automatic preemptive effect, rendering any
determination of congressional intent irrelevant and unnecessary. Latent exclusivity was,
therefore, understood more as a doctrine about the constitutional division of interstate
commerce powers than as a general, discretionary power of Congress.”).
76 See id at 808 (describing the shift to “an intent-based test”).
77 Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Wyeth, 555 US at 565, quoting Retail Clerks v Schermerhorn, 375 US 96, 103
(1963).
78 See generally Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53
SC L Rev 967, 971 (2002) (“[P]reemption doctrine . . . has evolved over the last century
from one based on an assumption of congressional legislative exclusivity and almost certain
preemption of state regulation to a doctrine, in the mid-part of the century, based on a
search for congressional intent to preempt so that state laws, particularly those based on
historical police powers, were not needlessly displaced.”).
79 Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in Buzbee, ed, Preemption Choice 192 (cited
in note 8).
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highlight the critical separation-of-powers dimension of federal-
ism.
1. What counts as preemption? The ﬁrst set of issues focuses on
the relation between legislative and judicial power in statutory
construction. Preemption cases do not typically involve the reach
of congressional power; the question, rather, is whether Congress
has in fact exercised its power to preempt state law. In recent
years, the Court has grappled with a series of questions at in-
creasing degrees of distance from Congress’s direct intent: How
should the courts construe ambiguous statutory language in ex-
press preemption cases? What sort of evidence can establish Con-
gress’s implicit intent to preempt a whole ﬁeld of regulation? How
much of a conﬂict between state and federal law should sufﬁce
for preemption? As Congress’s intent becomes more difﬁcult to
ascertain, the question becomes not whether but how judges should
ﬁll in the gaps, either by establishing default rules of statutory
construction (presumptions against, or sometimes in favor of, pre-
emption), by pursuing increasingly attenuated evidence of Con-
gress’s preferences, or by making their own judgments about pol-
icy conﬂicts.
At the outset, it will help to be a little more speciﬁc about the
difference between express and implied preemption, especially as
it bears on the application of the Rice presumption. Preemption
cases involve two distinct kinds of express provisions, and hence
two corresponding kinds of implication. Some statutes have ex-
press preemption provisions—that is, clauses that purport to spell
out the preemptive effect of the legislation on state law. Just about
all statutes, however, have express substantive provisions,80 and
these provisions may have preemptive effect to the extent that
they create conﬂicts with state law. “Express preemption,” as that
term is used in current doctrine, deals only with the former sit-
uation—that is, the construction of statutory provisions that ex-
pressly address the preemptive effect of federal law. Everything
else is “implied” preemption, even though such cases may involve
80 Not all, however. For example, the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat 156,
18 USC § 185, and the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat 76–77, current version codiﬁed at 28
USC § 1331(1), created federal judicial jurisdiction over collective bargaining and ad-
miralty disputes, respectively. Neither provided substantive rules of decision, but courts
have interpreted each as authorizing creation of federal common law that broadly preempts
state law. See Textile Workers Union of America v Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 US 448
(1957) (LMRA); Southern Paciﬁc Co. v Jensen, 244 US 205 (1917) (admiralty).
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painstaking construction of a statute’s express terms.
An interpretive presumption like the Rice canon generally
“serves as a kind of burden allocator or tie-breaker . . . but allows
the court to look to all relevant information and, if appropriate,
to ﬁnd an answer implicit in the statute despite the absence of
express language.”81 On the other hand, “[c]lear-statement rules
operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield
important values from an insufﬁciently strong legislative intent to
displace them”; “such rules foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides
to interpretation and even compel courts to select less plausible
candidates from within the range of permissible constructions.”82
Courts and scholars (including this one) sometimes lump these
two categories together,83 and much of the literature on “clear
statement” requirements should be taken as encompassing both
categories.84 Each category, moreover, both blurs around the edges
and encompasses meaningful differences in degree. A presump-
tion, for example, might permit a court to canvass a broad range
of sources of statutory meaning yet still impose a hefty burden of
proof; similarly, even when a statute explicitly deals with a matter
like preemption, the text may itself be far from clear. The scope
of the inquiry, in other words, is analytically distinct from the
weight of the burden of proof.
For present purposes, however, the distinction between pre-
sumptions and clear statement rules is helpful in pinning down
the sources to which a court may look when it evaluates Congress’s
preemptive intent. The presumption against preemption has gen-
erally been just that—a presumption, not a clear statement rule.85
If Rice were a strong clear statement rule, then there would only
be “express” preemption cases—if Congress did not include a tex-
tual provision spelling out the preemptive effect of legislation,
81 Shapiro, 67 NYU L Rev at 934 (cited in note 52) (footnote omitted).
82 EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co., 499 US 244, 262–63 (1991) (Marshall, J, dissenting).
83 See, for example, id at 265 n 2 (noting prior cases in which the Court purported to
apply a “clear-statement rule” but in fact “consulted the legislative history of the statutes
at issue”); Young, Gregory (cited in note 53).
84 See, for example, John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
Colum L Rev 399, 407–08 (2010).
85 See, for example, Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Though we generally ‘assume
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ we have traditionally not
thought that to require express statutory text.”) (quoting Rice, 331 US at 230).
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then the required clear statement would be lacking. Such a rule
would most likely be unmanageable, as Congress would have to
anticipate all the possible ways in which state law might undermine
federal legislation.86 It seems inevitable that courts will sometimes
have to evaluate implicit conﬂicts—that is, conﬂicts between the
practical action of federal and state legal rules.
One could argue that an interpretive presumption like Rice
should have no place in express preemption cases. After all, if
Congress has included an express preemption clause, then the
legislature has clearly stated its intent to preempt at least some
state law. Justice Scalia has thus argued that any presumption
against preemption “dissolves once there is conclusive evidence of
intent to pre-empt in the express words of the statute itself, and
the only remaining question is what the scope of that pre-emption
is meant to be. Thereupon, I think, our responsibility is to apply
to the text ordinary principles of statutory construction.”87
Justice Scalia’s approach seems overly simplistic, however. Con-
sider a federal statute governing medical devices that clearly states
Congress’s intention to preempt negligent design claims, for ex-
ample, but is ambiguous as to whether it preempts additional tort
claims. The clarity of Congress’s intentions with respect to neg-
ligent design hardly establishes that Congress also meant to pre-
empt claims for negligent manufacture or failure to warn. It is
unclear why the presumption against preemption should “dis-
solve,” in Justice Scalia’s terms, when we move from the ﬁrst
question to the second—that is, why the same concerns for state
autonomy that raise the interpretive bar to ﬁnd any preemption
should not also weigh against interpreting the scope of preemption
too broadly. After all, viewing the latter question as a subset of
the ﬁrst will generally be artiﬁcial. One might as well say that
although Congress has manifested an intent to preempt claims
relating to the design of a device, Congress has manifested no
preemptive intent at all with respect to manufacturing or warning
claims. Every federal statute clearly preempts some possible state
86 Alternatively, Congress could simply state a broadly preemptive default rule in the
statutory text. But that would simply substitute a problem of over-inclusion for one of
under-inclusion. If we want preemption that is actually tailored to the interaction of federal
and state laws in any sort of ﬁne-grained way, courts will have to consider implied conﬂicts.
87 Cipollone, 505 US at 545 (Scalia, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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laws, even if preemption is limited to a state statute directly coun-
termanding the federal provision.
Thus far, the Court has rejected Justice Scalia’s position and
applied the presumption against preemption even where Congress
has included an express preemption clause in the relevant statute.
As Justice Blackmun said in Cipollone,
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that un-
derlie the Court’s reluctance to ﬁnd pre-emption where Congress has
not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress
has spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not
whether Congress intended to pre-empt state regulation, but to what
extent. We do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer a scope of pre-
emption beyond that which clearly is mandated by Congress’ lan-
guage.88
As I will discuss shortly, however, this point remains controversial.
When we move from express to implied or conﬂict preemption
cases,89 we encounter a further distinction between those cases in
which the action of state and federal law creates “direct” or “ac-
tual” conﬂicts, and those cases in which state and federal law sim-
ply serve potentially contradictory purposes. The case law reﬂects
this distinction under the labels of “impossibility” and “obstacle”
preemption.90 Traditionally, the Court has deﬁned “impossibility”
very narrowly, limiting it to cases of “inevitable collision” between
state and federal law, where “compliance with both federal and
state [law] is a physical impossibility.”91 By contrast, the Court has
often deﬁned “conﬂicting purposes” or “obstacle” preemption
quite broadly, holding state law preempted where it “stands as an
88 Id at 533 (1992) (Blackmun, J, concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); see id at 516–18 (majority opinion) (applying the Rice pre-
sumption in construing the statute’s express preemption provisions).
89 I do not consider ﬁeld preemption as a distinct category here. A ﬁnding of ﬁeld
preemption simply represents a judgment that any state intrusion in the ﬁeld would conﬂict
with Congress’s intent, because Congress meant for federal regulation in the ﬁeld to be
exclusive. Field preemption may be express or implied, but in either case does not pose
any distinct problems for my purposes in this essay.
90 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro,
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 646 (Foundation, 6th ed 2009)
(“Hart & Wechsler”).
91 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132, 142–43 (1963); see also
Wyeth, 555 US at 573 (emphasizing that impossibility preemption “is a demanding de-
fense”). The Court expanded this category somewhat last Term in PLIVA, Inc. v Mensing,
131 S Ct 2567 (2011). See Part II.B.
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obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”92
It is not obvious how Rice should apply in conﬂict cases. Courts
generally formulate the Rice presumption as a rule of statutory
construction—that is, a tool for interpreting the legal import of
ambiguous statutory language. In conﬂict preemption cases, courts
have no text dealing with preemption to construe. Rather, two
sorts of uncertainty may exist: The substantive content of the
federal law may be ambiguous, such that it is unclear whether that
law actually creates a conﬂict with state law, or the conﬂict in
question may be so minor that a court is unsure whether Congress
would prefer for state and federal law to operate side by side.93 In
the former case, one could argue that Rice should be reserved for
interpreting express preemption provisions alone, so that “ordi-
nary” rules of construction—whatever those are—should govern
what the federal law actually does.94 That such an approach is
logically possible does not mean it makes sense, however. As Cathy
Sharkey has noted, a one-time trend against applying Rice in im-
plied conﬂict cases was “paradoxical because an interpretive default
rule or ‘thumb on the scale’ would seem warranted, if at all, where
there is no express statutory language.”95 In express preemption
cases, the Court has said that in choosing between “plausible al-
ternative reading[s]” of a federal statute, courts “have a duty to
accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”96 Applying the
92 Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941), citing Savage v Jones, 225 US 501, 533
(1912) (“If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished—if its operation
within its chosen ﬁeld else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural
effect—the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its
delegated power.”).
93 A third sort of uncertainty is possible, concerning the correct interpretation of state
law. Federal courts, however, do not enjoy the same latitude in interpreting state law that
they possess with regard to federal law. They are, ﬁrst and foremost, obligated to apply
state law as construed by the state’s highest court. Even where the state courts have not
deﬁnitively construed state law, federal courts are not generally free simply to set aside
the most likely reading of state law in favor of one that would avoid preemption (unless,
of course, that approach has itself been endorsed by the state’s highest court).
94 That position would be the inverse of Justice Scalia’s in Cipollone, which was that Rice
should apply only when there is no express preemption provision. Remarkably, Scalia has
in fact joined at least one opinion arguing that Rice should not apply in implied conﬂict
cases. See, for example, Wyeth, 555 US at 565 & n 14 (Alito, J, dissenting with Roberts
and Scalia).
95 Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo
Wash L Rev 449, 458 n 34 (2008).
96 Bates v Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 US 431 449 (2005).
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same rule to construing federal law in conﬂicts cases would protect
identical values of state autonomy.97
The second sort of ambiguity concerns the degree of tension
between state law and congressional purpose. Almost any two laws
will potentially undermine one another’s purposes; indeed, in the
Arizona immigration cases proponents of preemption have claimed
that even state measures that precisely mirror federal requirements
conﬂict with federal interests by adding a second and potentially
contradictory level of enforcement.98 The question in many con-
ﬂict preemption cases is thus just how much conﬂict is tolerable.99
Such an inquiry, practically speaking, is closer to a balancing of
interests (the degree of impedance to national purpose versus the
value of state autonomy) than to textual construction. In that con-
text, Rice’s presumption becomes a “thumb on the scale” repre-
senting the value of state autonomy.
The Court has often seemed to say that the Supremacy Clause
simply does not permit any such “balancing” of interests.100 Gen-
erally speaking, as Mark Rosen has pointed out, “preemption is a
‘unilateralist’ doctrine that takes account of only one of the in-
stitutions whose interests are at stake: the federal government.”101
But the unilateralist character of preemption doctrine must be
compromised once we recognize that virtually all preemption cases
97 Indeed, the Court has frequently applied clear statement rules to limit the substantive
sweep of federal law. See, for example, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 US 159 (2001); United States v Jones, 529 US 848
(2000); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991); Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
US 58 (1989).
98 See Chamber of Commerce v Whiting, 131 S Ct 1968, 1990–91 (2011) (Breyer, J,
dissenting).
99 See, for example, Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 373 (2000)
(observing that “[w]hat is a sufﬁcient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by
examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects”).
100 See, for example, Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 US 88,
108 (1992) (observing that “under the Supremacy Clause . . . ‘any state law, however
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal
law, must yield’” and therefore rejecting “petitioner’s argument that the State’s interest
in licensing various occupations can save from OSH Act pre-emption those provisions
that directly and substantially affect workplace safety,” quoting Felder v Casey, 487 US
131, 138 (1988)); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v De La Cuesta, 458 US 141,
153 (1982), quoting Free v Bland, 369 US 663, 666 (1962) (“The relative importance to
the State of its own law is not material when there is a conﬂict with a valid federal law,
for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.”).
101 Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 Nw U L Rev 781, 785 (2008) (con-
trasting preemption with “multilateralist” doctrines that “ask[] the decisionmaker to take
account of the concerns of all relevant institutions whose interests are implicated”).
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involve some degree of arguable conﬂict between state and federal
law, and in some cases, the conﬂict between state and federal law
is just not sufﬁciently serious to warrant preemption. Tom Merrill
has noted, for instance, that preemption cases assess not simply
whether “federal law . . . is in tension with state law” but also
“whether this tension is sufﬁciently severe to warrant the dis-
placement of state law.”102 Preemption doctrine thus cannot pro-
ceed without some standard for how much conﬂict is too much.
If the Court were to reject Rice’s version of that standard, it would
still have to come up with some other standard to replace it.
Rice survived an all-out assault from litigants in the Supreme
Court in the 2008 Term.103 In Altria Group, Inc. v Good,104 the
Court rejected a strong push from pro-preemption amici to elim-
inate the presumption in express preemption cases. And in Wyeth
v Levine,105 the Court turned back arguments that the presumption
should not apply in implied preemption cases. Altria was a suit
under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by smokers of “light”
cigarettes alleging that the cigarette manufacturers had fraudu-
lently advertised that light cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine
than regular brands. The Court rejected both express and implied
preemption arguments under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act and the Federal Trade Commission’s regulatory
activities, respectively. In the course of the express preemption
argument, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion reafﬁrmed that
“[w]hen addressing questions of express or implied pre-emption,
we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”106
The Court explained, moreover, what this means in the express
preemption context: “when the text of a pre-emption clause is
102 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw U L Rev 727, 743
(2008); see also Untereiner, 84 Tulane L Rev at 1260 (cited in note 11) (observing that
in conﬂict preemption cases, “courts make judgments about whether the degree of tension
between federal and state laws rises to the level of an impermissible conﬂict under the
Supremacy Clause”).
103 See generally Dan Schweitzer, The Presumption Against Preemption Strikes Back: The
Lessons of Altria Group v. Good and Wyeth v. Levine, NAAGazette (2009), online at http:/
/www.naag.org/the-presumption-against-preemption-strikes-back-the-lessons-of-altria-
group-v.-good-and-wyeth-v.-levine.php.
104 555 US 70 (2008).
105 555 US 555 (2009).
106 Altria, 555 US at 77, quoting Rice, 331 US at 230.
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susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily
‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’”107 In a dissent
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito, Jus-
tice Thomas insisted that, in recent years, “the Court’s reliance
on the presumption against pre-emption has waned in the express
pre-emption context.”108 Noting that “[t]he Court has invoked the
presumption sporadically” and ignored it in a number of cases,109
Thomas complained that the presumption results in “artiﬁcially
narrow construction[s]” of preemption provisions that “distort the
statutory text.”110
Wyeth, on the other hand, focused on implied preemption. Di-
ana Levine brought a Vermont common law tort claim against
Wyeth, alleging that the drug manufacturer had failed to provide
adequate warnings that its antinausea drug Phenergan could cause
gangrene if administered by an “IV-push” method. The Court
rejected claims that federal law made it impossible to comply with
state tort rules that required a better warning and that state liability
would interfere with Congress’s purpose in entrusting a federal
agency, the Food and Drug Administration, with authority to ap-
prove new drugs and drug labels. Echoing arguments by Wyeth’s
amici,111 Justice Alito’s dissent argued that the only question in
conﬂict cases is “whether there is an ‘actual conﬂict’ between state
and federal law; if so, then pre-emption follows automatically by
operation of the Supremacy Clause.”112 That question left no room
for any presumption against preemption, and Alito asserted that
the Court had in fact not applied any such presumption in its
previous conﬂict preemption cases.113 Justice Stevens’s majority
107 Altria, 555 US at 77, quoting Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 449 (2005).
108 Altria, 555 US at 98 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
109 Id at 99.
110 Id at 98, 101.
111 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Wyeth v Levine, No 06-1249, *27–28 (US ﬁled June 3,
2008) (arguing that the federal courts should not apply a presumption against preemption);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Products Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in Support of Petitioner,
Wyeth v Levine, No 06-1249, *15–18 (US ﬁled May 30, 2008) (arguing that the presumption
against preemption does not apply to a conﬂicts preemption analysis).
112 Wyeth, 555 US at 624 (Alito, J, dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia
joined Justice Alito’s dissent.
113 Id at 624 n 14.
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opinion, however, ﬂatly rejected Alito’s assertion, stating that “this
Court has long held to the contrary.”114
As a matter of current principle, then, Rice continues to apply
in both express and implied preemption settings. Despite these
express and recent reafﬁrmations of Rice, the Court frequently
neglects to mention it. This occurs both in cases where the Court
ﬁnds preemption and in cases where it does not. It thus seems fair
to say that the legitimacy, strength, and scope of a presumption
against preemption remains a live issue.
2. Who can preempt state law? The second set of issues implicates
a distinct set of separation-of-powers concerns. Here the questions
concern which branches of the federal government may preempt
state law, and by what sorts of actions. The Supremacy Clause
suggests that only Congress may preempt state law, by enacting
“Laws of the United States made in Pursuance [of this Consti-
tution].”115 Nonetheless, the Court has said that federal admin-
istrative agencies, exercising authority delegated by Congress, may
preempt state law in certain circumstances.116 Likewise, federal
courts may sometimes fashion federal common law rules that pre-
empt state law.117
The limits of executive-agency and judicial preemption remain
uncertain, however. Executive preemption occurs in a variety of
scenarios, from an agency interpreting a statute to preempt state
law to an independent preemptive action originating with the
agency itself; such action, moreover, may take a range of forms
from legislative rules promulgated after notice and comment to
less formal agency actions.118 When the agency interprets statutes
as preempting state law, the issue becomes how much deference,
if any, courts should accord to that judgment.119 When the agency
114 Id at 565 n 3 (majority opinion), citing California v ARC America Corp., 490 US 93,
101–02 (1989); Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 US 707,
716 (1985); and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v Moran, 536 US 355, 387 (2002).
115 US Const, Art VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause also indicates that the President and
the Senate, by negotiating and ratifying self-executing treaties, can also preempt state law.
Id.
116 Fidelity Savings & Loan v De La Cuesta, 458 US 141 (1982).
117 See, for example, Southern Paciﬁc Co. v Jensen, 244 US 205 (1917) (holding that
federal common law rules in admiralty preempt state law).
118 See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw U L Rev 869, 881–900 (2008).
119 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich L Rev 737 (2004) (arguing
that “political accountability . . . agency expertise, self-interest, and the prospect of in-
creased arbitrariness in decisionmaking . . . all weigh against an across-the-board pre-
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takes preemptive action on its own, the broader question is what
sorts of acts can have preemptive effects. On the judicial side,
federal common law jurisprudence remains murky as to the precise
circumstances that warrant judicial lawmaking.120
The separation-of-powers issues raised by both sets of preemp-
tion cases have major implications for federalism. In recent years,
a burgeoning literature has addressed the important ways in which
the federal separation of powers protects the autonomy of the
states.121 Contemporary federalism jurisprudence emphasizes the
states’ representation in Congress as the primary safeguard of fed-
eralism; on this view, Congress is structured so as to take state
regulatory interests into account before it acts.122 Federal agencies,
on the other hand, have no such incentives and can generally
increase their own power by preempting state law. William Es-
kridge’s survey of Supreme Court preemption cases involving fed-
eral administrative agencies between the 1984 and 2005 Terms
found that “agencies pressed pro-preemption positions in two-
thirds of the cases.”123 The only surprising thing about that num-
ber is that it is lower than one might expect.
Scholars have also emphasized how the procedural difﬁculty of
enacting federal legislation, the multiple veto-gates that legislative
proposals must navigate, and the limited nature of Congress’s
agenda ensure that all federal legislation—including, of course,
preemptive legislation—will be relatively rare.124 The difﬁculty of
sumption of deference to the agency”); Merrill, 102 Nw U L Rev at 769–79 (cited in
note 102) (arguing that courts should defer to agency interpretations “only to the extent
they are persuasive, thereby preserving judicial authority to maintain a uniform jurispru-
dence of preemption”).
120 Compare Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw U L Rev 805 (1989) (taking
a very broad view), with Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 Notre
Dame L Rev 1639, 1671–79 (2008) (considerably more skeptical).
121 See, for example, Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 Tex L Rev 1321 (2001); Stuart M. Benjamin and Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net
Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L J 2111 (2008).
122 See, for example, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528,
550–51 (1985) (observing that “the composition of the Federal Government was designed
in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress”); Wechsler, 54 Colum
L Rev at 559 (cited in note 35) (arguing that states’ representatives “control the legislative
process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of
Congress”).
123 William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1441,
1484 (2008).
124 See Clark, 83 Notre Dame L Rev at 1707 (cited in note 35) (“The federal government
. . . may adopt ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ only by employing precise, constitutionally
prescribed procedures.”); Young, 46 Vill L Rev at 1363 (cited in note 39) (“Federal action
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federal lawmaking, combined with at least some degree of con-
gressional sympathy for state regulators, operates to ensure that
federal law remains more interstitial than pervasive in nature125—
although that arrangement is constantly eroding.126
From this standpoint, shifting preemptive authority away from
Congress to judicial or executive institutions that do not represent
the states and that can promulgate federal norms more easily than
Congress amounts to a signiﬁcant threat to state autonomy. When
courts preempt state law based on implicit conﬂicts with federal
policy or allow federal agencies to preempt state law by legislative
ﬁat, they compound the central difﬁculty of contemporary fed-
eralism doctrine—that is, the Court’s failure to articulate mean-
ingful and sustainable limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.127
In this doctrinal landscape, it is critical that the Court fashion
meaningful limits on the preemptive scope of the legislation that
Congress does enact and on the ability of nonlegislative federal
actors to extend that scope.
Of the two nonlegislative preemption problems, executive
branch preemption is probably the more pressing. Preemption by
administrative agency action became especially salient during the
second Bush administration, which came to ofﬁce with an extensive
tort-reform agenda. When that agenda was largely stymied in
Congress, the administration turned to the agencies, several of
which issued broad interpretive “preambles” to federal regulations
expressing the agency’s judgment that federal regulatory decisions
preempted further regulation—especially common law tort reg-
ulation—at the state level.128 Similarly, the Bush administration
remains interstitial . . . not only because of political opposition from the states but because
federal law is simply difﬁcult to make.” (footnote omitted)).
125 See Henry Hart and Herbert L. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
435 (Foundation, 1st ed 1953).
126 The current edition of Hart & Wechsler, for example, comments that “[i]n the more
than ﬁfty years since the First Edition was published, the expansion of federal legislation
and administrative regulation . . . has accelerated; today one ﬁnds many more instances
in which federal enactments supply both right and remedy in, or wholly occupy, a particular
ﬁeld.” Hart & Wechsler at 459 (cited in note 90).
127 See, for example, Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s authority
to regulate medicinal use of homegrown marijuana); South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203
(1987). See generally Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement
Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L & Contemp Probs no. 3, 157 (2012)
(arguing that limits on the Commerce and Spending Powers are generally underenforced
in contemporary federalism doctrine).
128 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Preemption War: When Federal Bureaucracies Trump
Local Juries 3–5 (Yale, 2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies
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resorted to agency action in an effort to overturn Oregon’s “Death
with Dignity Act” permitting physician-assisted suicide, after leg-
islative efforts to preempt that law failed in Congress.129 And the
Obama administration has resorted to executive action—federal
lawsuits alleging implied preemption claims—to combat restrictive
state immigration policies, rather than pursuing legislative re-
form.130
Executive preemption has had a mixed reception in the Supreme
Court. Professor Eskridge found that, in agency preemption cases
between 1984 and 2006, “the Court rejected preemption claims
in 47.3% (62/131 cases) of the cases and accepted preemption
claims in 45.8% (60/131 cases), with 6.9% (9/131 cases) mixed,”
notwithstanding that the relevant agency favored preemption in
two-thirds of the cases.131 Six years ago, the Court rejected pre-
emption in the Oregon case, emphasizing the states’ traditional
authority to regulate the medical profession.132 In Wyeth, the Court
refused to defer to an FDA preamble in construing the preemptive
effect of federal law. The Court emphasized that while it has “given
‘some weight’ to an agency’s views about the impact of tort law
on federal objectives when ‘the subject matter is technica[l] and
the relevant history and background are complex and extensive,’
. . . we have not deferred to an agency’s conclusion that state law
is pre-empted.”133 Justice Thomas made a similar point last Term
in PLIVA, Inc. v Mensing, noting that “[a]lthough we defer to the
agency’s interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an
agency’s ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be
pre-empted.”134 Nonetheless, it would be a stretch to say that the
Court has come to rest on the complicated cluster of issues sur-
rounding preemption by federal administrative agencies.
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L Rev 227, 230–42 (2007) (reviewing the
preemption preambles in rules promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Admin-
istration).
129 See Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 252–53 (2006) (“Members of Congress concerned
about ODWDA invited the DEA to prosecute . . . Oregon physicians who assist suicide.”).
130 Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Widens Challenges to State Immigration Laws, Wash-
ington Post (Sept 29, 2011), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-adminis
tration-widens-challenges-to-state-immigration-laws/2011/09/28/gIQA8HgR7K_story.html.
131 Eskridge, 83 Notre Dame L Rev at 1484 (cited in note 123).
132 Gonzales, 546 US at 270.
133 Wyeth, 555 US at 576–77, quoting Geier, 529 US at 883 (alteration in original).
134 131 S Ct at 2575 n 3, citing Wyeth, 555 US at 576.
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Judicial preemption comes up somewhat less often than agency
preemption, yet it remains important and in need of clariﬁcation
by the Court. The critical decision here is, of course, Erie Railroad
Co. v Tompkins,135 which held that, in the absence of a federal
statute or constitutional provision, federal courts may not ordi-
narily displace state law.136 Notwithstanding Erie, federal courts
have maintained their authority to formulate common law rules
of decision in certain circumstances,137 and unlike the “general”
common law applied by federal courts in diversity cases prior to
Erie, the “new federal common law” is “federal” within the mean-
ing of the Supremacy Clause and therefore preempts state law.138
Courts generally offer three distinct rationales in support of their
authority to fashion federal common law: Much federal common
lawmaking is interstitial, ﬁlling in “gaps” in federal statutes to
achieve the ends intended by Congress;139 sometimes Congress
explicitly or (more often) implicitly delegates lawmaking authority
to the courts;140 and, ﬁnally, much federal common law rests on
the asserted need to fashion a federal rule of decision to protect
federal interests.141
This last category, which Tom Merrill has called “preemptive”
lawmaking,142 is the most troubling for preemption doctrine. Pre-
135 304 US 64 (1938).
136 See id at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. . . . There is no
federal general common law.”).
137 We lack an agreed-upon deﬁnition of federal common law. See generally Hart &
Wechsler at 607 & n 1 (cited in note 90) (comparing deﬁnitions and “us[ing] the term
loosely to refer to federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced directly by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands”).
138 See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 NYU L Rev 383 (1964).
139 See, for example, D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v FDIC, 315 US 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson,
J, concurring) (“Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent.
This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and
is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself.”).
140 See, for example, FRE 501 (expressly delegating authority to the courts to formulate
federal common law rules of privileges in federal question cases); National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679, 688 (1978) (interpreting the broad language
of the Sherman Act as an implicit delegation of authority to courts to fashion a federal
common law of antitrust).
141 See, for example, Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964) (formulating
a federal common law “act of state” doctrine to protect federal interests in political branch
control of foreign policy).
142 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1,
36–39 (1985).
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empting state law based on federal “interests”—not federal positive
law, such as a statute or even an agency regulation—not only runs
counter to the text of the Supremacy Clause but also end-runs
the political and procedural safeguards at the center of contem-
porary federalism doctrine. I have argued elsewhere that this sort
of federal common lawmaking, if it can be justiﬁed at all, should
be viewed as a form of conﬂict preemption.143 Preemptive common
lawmaking thus occurs when state law would interfere with some
federal regulatory scheme, but simply voiding the state law would
leave an unacceptable gap. The court ﬁlls in the gap by fashioning
a federal common law rule of decision, much as it might ﬁll in an
omission in an express statutory scheme, doing its best to conform
that rule to Congress’s overall intent in the ﬁeld.144 Perhaps rec-
ognizing that even this somewhat narrower view is tough to square
with federalism doctrine, the Supreme Court has seemed to view
preemptive federal common lawmaking with increasing skepticism
in recent years.145
II. The Supreme Court’s 2010 Term Preemption Bonanza
Preemption cases have not been scarce on the Court’s
docket in recent years, but last Term’s output remains extraor-
dinary by any measure. The Court issued ﬁve major decisions,
addressing issues ranging from automobile and drug safety to class
action litigation to the tug-of-war between the national and state
governments over immigration policy. Factually speaking, several
of these cases seemed to involve replays of recent important de-
cisions, offering the Court a chance to deﬁne the limits of those
earlier rulings. Moreover, the volume of preemption litigation—
both last Term and in recent years—seems to be encouraging at
least some of the Justices to think about preemption as a matter
of general principle, rather than as a mass of largely unrelated
issues of statutory construction arising under different regulatory
regimes. That is not to say, however, that preemption battles can
143 See Young, 83 Notre Dame L Rev at 1669–71 (cited in note 120).
144 See id (analogizing to administrative law, where “the existence of a gap in a federal
regulatory scheme is often construed as an implicit delegation by Congress to the agency
that administers the statute of authority to make law that ‘ﬁlls in’ the gap” (footnote
omitted)).
145 See, for example, Atherton v FDIC, 519 US 213, 218 (1997); Hart & Wechsler 628–
29 (cited in note 90).
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ever fully transcend the statutory terrain on which they are fought;
indeed, if there is any clear lesson from last Term’s cases, it is that
different statutes yield different results.
a. williamson v mazda motor
Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,146 involved the pre-
emptive effect of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208,147
a Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulation that re-
quired automobile manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder seat-
belts in the rear seats of passenger vehicles, but allowed those
manufacturers the option of installing lap-only belts for rear inner
seats. The case arose out of a tragic head-on collision between
the Williamson family’s Mazda minivan and another vehicle. Del-
bert Williamson and his daughter, Alexa, who were strapped in
with lap-and-shoulder belts, survived the crash; Delbert’s wife,
Thanh, however, was wearing only a lap belt and died. The Wil-
liamsons sued Mazda on various state tort theories, all of which
argued that the manufacturer should have provided a lap-and-
shoulder belt for Thanh’s rear interior seat as well. The case thus
presented the question whether FMVSS 208, by allowing man-
ufacturers a choice as to what sort of seatbelts to install in rear
interior seats, preempted state common law actions that would
effectively require the installation of lap-and-shoulder belts.
The California Court of Appeal thought that it had seen all this
before, in the Supreme Court’s 2000 ruling in Geier v American
Honda Motor Co.148 That case involved another provision in an
earlier version of FMVSS 208 that required auto manufacturers
to install passive restraints in cars, but left manufacturers a choice
whether to use airbags, automatic seatbelts, or some other passive
system. Geier held that FMVSS 208 preempted a state tort suit
against Honda for failing to install a driver’s side airbag that might
have protected Alexis Geier from severe injuries in a crash.149 Like
many lower courts, the California appellate court in Williamson
read Geier as holding that a federal regulatory decision to allow
146 131 S Ct 1131 (2011).
147 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 54 Fed Reg
46257–46258 (1989).
148 529 US 861 (2000).
149 Id at 874.
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manufacturers a choice preempts state tort theories that would
require them to adopt a particular form of equipment.150
The Supreme Court reversed the California court—somewhat
remarkably without dissent. Writing for the Court as he had in
Geier, Justice Breyer followed the earlier decision’s roadmap but
arrived at a different destination. The ﬁrst two questions con-
cerned the language of the National Trafﬁc and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act,151 which includes both an express preemption clause
and a savings clause. The preemption provision says that “no
State” may “establish, or . . . continue in effect . . . any safety
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance” of a motor
vehicle or item of equipment “which is not identical to the Federal
standard.”152 The savings clause, on the other hand, provides that
“[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law.”153 Geier read
the savings clause to make clear that state tort suits fall outside
the scope of the preemption clause, and Williamson reafﬁrmed that
reading.154 As in Geier, however, the Court rejected the proposition
that the savings clause immunized state tort suits not only from
the effect of the preemption clause but also from principles of
conﬂict preemption.155
Geier held state tort suits preempted on the ground that liability
for failing to provide airbags would stand as an obstacle to the
purpose of FMVSS 208, which was to give manufacturers a choice
as to which passive restraint system to install.156 In Williamson,
Justice Breyer conceded “that the history of the regulation before
us resembles the history of airbags to some degree.”157 Speciﬁcally,
DOT had ordered manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder belts
in rear outer seats but decided to leave manufacturers a choice as
to which kind of belt to install in rear inner seats. The Court
150 167 Cal App 4th 905, 914–17 (2008); see also Carden v General Motors Corp., 509
F3d 227 (5th Cir 2007); Grifﬁth v General Motors Corp., 303 F3d 1276 (11th Cir 2002);
Heinricher v Volvo Car Corp., 809 NE2d 1094 (Mass App 2004).
151 Pub L No 89-563, 80 Stat 718 (1966), codiﬁed as amended at 15 USC § 1381.
152 15 USC § 1392(d) (1988).
153 15 USC § 1397(k).
154 See Geier, 529 US at 868; Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1135–36.
155 Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1136.
156 529 US at 875–81.
157 131 S Ct at 1137.
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determined, however, that manufacturer choice was not a “sig-
niﬁcant regulatory objective” of the seatbelt regulation in the way
that it had been for the passive restraint regulation in Geier.158 As
Justice Breyer explained,
DOT here was not concerned about consumer acceptance; it was con-
vinced that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety; it did not fear
additional safety risks arising from use of those belts; it had no interest
in assuring a mix of devices; and, though it was concerned about ad-
ditional costs, that concern was diminishing.159
As the last point indicates, the Court found no independent pre-
emptive force in the agency’s judgment that lap-and-shoulder belts
in rear inner seats would not be cost effective. “[M]any, perhaps
most, federal safety regulations embody some kind of cost-effec-
tiveness judgment. While an agency could base a decision to pre-
empt on its cost-effectiveness judgment, we are satisﬁed that the
rulemaking record at issue here discloses no such pre-emptive
intent.”160
Finally, the Court accorded some degree of deference to the
agency’s view that FMVSS 208 did not preempt the state tort
actions at issue. Geier had observed that “the agency’s own views
should make a difference,”161 and Williamson reafﬁrmed that view,
albeit without specifying exactly how much difference they should
make. Justice Breyer did emphasize that the Solicitor General’s
position in the litigation was consistent with DOT’s long-standing
position on the matter.162 The Court accordingly concluded that
“even though the state tort suit may restrict the manufacturer’s
choice, it does not ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment
. . . of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.”163
All the sitting Justices except Justice Thomas joined Justice
Breyer’s opinion for the Court.164 Justice Sotomayor wrote a short
concurrence “only to emphasize the Court’s rejection of an over-
158 Id.
159 Id at 1338. Each of these factors had been otherwise in Geier.
160 Id. Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1139.
161 529 US at 883.
162 131 S Ct at 1139.
163 Id at 1139–40, quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941) (alterations in
original).
164 Justice Kagan was recused on account of her role in the case as Solicitor General
prior to joining the Court.
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reading of Geier that has developed since that opinion was is-
sued.”165 She stressed that “Geier does not stand . . . for the prop-
osition that any time an agency gives manufacturers a choice be-
tween two or more options, a tort suit that imposes liability on
the basis of one of the options is an obstacle to the achievement
of a federal regulatory objective and may be pre-empted.”166
Rather, “state tort suits are not obstacles” to federal law “[a]bsent
strong indications from the agency that it needs manufacturers to
have options in order to achieve a signiﬁcant regulatory objec-
tive.”167
Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, arguing that
the savings clause “speaks directly to the [preemption] question
and answers it.”168 As he had in Geier, Thomas maintained that
the statutory savings clause was not directed only at limiting the
scope of the express preemption clause, but rather independently
saved all state common-law claims.169 Thomas spent the majority
of his concurrence criticizing the Court’s reliance on “purposes-
and-objectives pre-emption,” noting that he had rejected this ap-
proach to preemption “as inconsistent with the Constitution be-
cause it turns entirely on extratextual ‘judicial suppositions.’”170 As
Thomas put it, the majority’s analysis asked “whether the regu-
lators really wanted manufacturers to have a choice or did not
really want them to have a choice but gave them one anyway”—
a question that could be answered only by “a ‘freewheeling, ex-
tratextual, and broad evaluatio[n] of the purposes and objectives’
of FMVSS 208.”171 He complained, moreover, that the fact “[t]hat
the Court in Geier reached an opposite conclusion reveals the
utterly unconstrained nature of purposes-and-objectives pre-emp-
tion”; after all, “the only difference” between Williamson and Geier
165 131 S Ct at 1140 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
166 Id (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
167 Id (internal quotation marks omitted). It was not completely clear from Justice So-
tomayor’s discussion whether this “strong indications” standard was a general judgment
about when state common law claims should be preempted or a product of the statutory
savings clause. See id at 1141 (indicating that respondents had not met the standard,
“[e]specially in light of” the savings clause).
168 Id at 1141 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
169 Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1141–42, citing Geier, 529 US at 896–98 (Stevens, J, dis-
senting). Justice Thomas had joined Justice Stevens’s dissent in Geier.
170 Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1142, citing Wyeth, 555 US at 603 (Thomas, J, concurring
in the judgment).
171 Williamson, 131 S Ct at 1142.
288 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2011
“is the majority’s ‘psychoanalysis’ of the regulators.”172
b. pliva, inc. v mensing
If Williamson seemed like a reprise of Geier, then PLIVA, Inc. v
Mensing173 arrived at the Court as an apparent rerun of Wyeth v
Levine.174 In Wyeth, the Court held that the federal Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) approval of a drug—and, in particular, of
the warnings on the drug’s label—did not preempt state tort suits
for failure to warn of dangers associated with the drug’s use.175
PLIVA raised the same issue in the context of generic drugs. Under
federal law, manufacturers of a new drug must obtain FDA ap-
proval by proving that the drug is safe and effective—an arduous
and time-consuming process involving “costly and lengthy” clin-
ical testing.176 Although all drugs once had to go through this
process, Congress amended the law in 1984 to provide an expe-
dited approval process for “generic” forms of drugs that had al-
ready been approved by the FDA.177 Such drugs must simply show
“equivalence” to a “reference listed drug” that has already been
approved.178 Similar rules apply to the warnings on a drug’s label.
A new drug’s manufacturer must show that the proposed label is
accurate and adequate,179 while a generic drug manufacturer must
show simply that the “labeling proposed . . . is the same as the
labeling approved for the listed drug.”180
The defendants in PLIVA manufactured a generic form of the
drug metoclopramide, a drug commonly used to treat digestive-
tract disorders. The FDA approved metoclopramide in 1980 under
the brand name “Reglan”; since that time, however, evidence
emerged that the drug can cause a severe and often irreversible
172 Id at 1143, quoting United States v Public Utility Commission of California, 345 US
295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J, concurring).
173 131 S Ct 2567 (2011).
174 555 US 555 (2009).
175 See id at 559.
176 131 S Ct at 2574; see also 21 USC §§ 355(b)(1), (d).
177 This legislation, formally entitled the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585, is “commonly called the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments.” 131 S Ct at 2574.
178 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A).
179 See id §§ 355(d)(6), (7).
180 Id § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
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neurological disorder called “tardive dyskinesia.” Over the years,
the FDA approved several changes to Reglan’s labeling to increase
the strength of its warnings about tardive dyskinesia, culminating
in 2009 with a “black box” warning that “[t]reatment with me-
toclopramide for longer than 12 weeks should be avoided in all
but rare cases.”181 Prior to the development of the stronger labels,
physicians prescribed generic forms of metoclopramide to Gladys
Mensing and Julie Demahy, who each developed tardive dyskinesia
after taking the drug for several years.182
Both patients sued the drug’s manufacturers, in separate law-
suits, claiming that the manufacturers had failed to change their
warning labels “despite mounting evidence that long term me-
toclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia far greater
than that indicated on the label.”183 The manufacturers defended
on preemption grounds, arguing that federal law’s requirement
that their warning labels be the same as the brand-name drug’s
label made it impossible for them to carry out any state tort-law
duty to adopt a stronger warning. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits
both rejected the preemption defense.184
A divided Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and re-
versed in each. Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, which also
included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito. Because the prescription drug statutes expressly save state
regulation in the absence of a “direct and positive conﬂict” with
federal law,185 controversy focused on conﬂict preemption and, in
particular, on the little-used doctrine of “impossibility.”186 Prior
cases had conﬁned that concept to cases where “compliance with
both federal and state [law] is a physical impossibility.”187 PLIVA
grappled with what that standard meant in a complex regulatory
setting where a state-law defendant’s actions are subject to federal
regulatory approval. In so doing, the Court arguably expanded the
“impossibility” category.
181 131 S Ct at 2573.
182 Id.
183 Mensing v Wyeth, Inc., 588 F3d 603, 605 (8th Cir 2009).
184 Id at 614; Demahy v Actavis, Inc., 593 F3d 428, 449 (5th Cir 2010).
185 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub L No 87-781 (1962), § 202, 76 Stat 780.
186 The Court reserved the question “whether state and federal law ‘directly conﬂict’
in circumstances beyond ‘impossibility.’” 131 S Ct at 2577 n 4.
187 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132, 142–43 (1963).
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The parties in PLIVA agreed that, taking the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations as true, “[s]tate law required the Manufacturers to use
a different, safer label.”188 They disagreed, however, about the
options that federal law left open for changing the label. Deferring
to the FDA’s view, the Court held that FDA regulations “pre-
vented the Manufacturers from independently changing their ge-
neric drugs’ safety labels.”189 It assumed for the sake of argument,
however, that “federal law also required the Manufacturers to ask
for FDA assistance in convincing the brand-name manufacturer
to adopt a stronger label, so that all corresponding generic drug
manufacturers could do so as well.”190 Even assuming that this
requirement existed, however, the majority found impossibility
preemption on the ground that “[i]t was not lawful under federal
law for the Manufacturers to do what state law required of them
[i.e., change the label]. And even if they had fulﬁlled their federal
duty to ask for FDA assistance, they would not have satisﬁed the
requirements of state law.”191
The plaintiffs’ argument against preemption asserted “that when
a private party’s ability to comply with state law depends on ap-
proval and assistance from the FDA, proving pre-emption requires
that party to demonstrate that the FDA would not have allowed
compliance with state law.”192 On this view, the manufacturers
would have failed to establish preemption “because they did not
even try to start the process that might ultimately have allowed
them to use a safer label.”193 Justice Thomas reasoned that this
approach “would render conﬂict pre-emption largely meaning-
less”; after all, even if federal law ﬂatly prohibited compliance with
state duties, defendants could have petitioned Congress to amend
the law.194 Instead, the majority concluded that “when a party
cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s
special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the ex-
ercise of judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot inde-
188 131 S Ct at 2574.
189 Id at 2577.
190 Id.
191 Id at 2577–78.
192 PLIVA, 131 S Ct at 2578–79.
193 Id at 2579.
194 Id.
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pendently satisfy those state duties for pre-emption purposes.”195
This conclusion required the Court to distinguish Wyeth, in
which the plaintiff also contended that the defendant drug man-
ufacturers’ FDA-approved warning label was insufﬁcient to satisfy
the manufacturers’ duty to warn under state law. Federal law per-
mitted manufacturers of a brand-name drug, however, “to unilat-
erally strengthen its warning” without advance approval from the
FDA.196 This made it possible for a regulated entity to comply
with state law duties, and it made no difference that the FDA
retained authority to disapprove the new label after its adoption
by the manufacturer: “[A]bsent clear evidence that the FDA would
not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we will not
conclude that it was impossible to comply with both federal and
state requirements.”197 As the PLIVA Court described its earlier
holding, “the possibility of impossibility was not enough.”198
The Court acknowledged that its reasoning in PLIVA produced
some odd results. Justice Thomas recognized that, “[h]ad Mensing
and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name drug prescribed by
their doctors, Wyeth would control and their lawsuits would not
be pre-empted.”199 The disparity arose, however, from the reality
that the statutory regimes for brand-name and generic drugs “are
meaningfully different.”200 “We will not distort the Supremacy
Clause,” the majority insisted, “in order to create similar pre-
emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme.”201
Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, and accused the majority of “dilut[ing] the
impossibility standard.”202 In particular, she saw no meaningful
distinction between PLIVA and Wyeth. Because federal law per-
mitted the generic drug manufacturers to ask the FDA to initiate
a label change, the possibility that the FDA would have refused
to do so “demonstrated only ‘a hypothetical or potential con-
195 Id at 2581.
196 Wyeth, 555 US at 73.
197 Id at 571.
198 131 S Ct at 2581 n 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199 Id at 2581.
200 Id at 2582.
201 Id.
202 131 S Ct at 2582 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
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ﬂict.’”203 This possibility of adverse action by the federal regulators
was no different from the possibility that the FDA would have
vetoed a changed label in Wyeth—a possibility that the earlier court
found insufﬁcient for preemption. Emphasizing the Court’s prior
statements that “[i]mpossibility pre-emption . . . ‘is a demanding
defense,’” the dissenters insisted that in this case, as in Wyeth, “the
mere possibility of impossibility is not enough.”204
The dissent also emphasized the importance of generic drugs,
noting that “[t]oday’s decision affects 75 percent of all prescription
drugs dispensed in this country.”205 This meant that the Court’s
preemption ruling would create a large class of consumers without
recourse in the event of injury.206 The dissenters likewise predicted
that the decision would undermine drug safety. Noting that “[t]he
FDA has limited resources to conduct postapproval monitoring
of drug safety,”207 Justice Sotomayor asserted that “[t]oday’s de-
cision eliminates the traditional state-law incentives for generic
manufacturers to monitor and disclose safety risks.”208 Moreover,
“brand-name manufacturers often leave the market once generic
versions are available, meaning that there will be no manufacturer
subject to failure-to-warn liability.”209 These factors, ﬁnally, might
well discourage physicians from prescribing generic drugs and pa-
tients from accepting them.210
c. bruesewitz v wyeth llc
The Court confronted yet another drug statute in Bruesewitz v
Wyeth LLC.211 In the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 (NCVIA),212 Congress took vaccines out of the traditional
prescription drug regime construed in Wyeth and PLIVA. That
traditional regime generally relies on federal premarket approval
combined with back-end state tort regulation. The NCVIA instead
203 Id at 2588, quoting Rice v Norman Williams Co., 458 US 654, 659 (1982).
204 131 S Ct at 2587, quoting Wyeth, 555 US at 573 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
205 Id at 2583.
206 Id at 2592.
207 Id at 2584
208 Id at 2592 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
209 Id at 2593 (citation omitted).
210 Id.
211 131 S Ct 1068 (2011).
212 Pub L No 99-660, 100 Stat 3758, codiﬁed as amended at 42 USC § 300aa et seq.
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established “a no-fault compensation program” under which a per-
son injured by a vaccine may seek compensation by ﬁling a petition
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the Court
of Federal Claims. A special master reviews these petitions under
the Court’s supervision, after which a claimant may either accept
the judgment or seek relief through the tort system.213 This process
affords compensation for a wide variety of medical expenses and
injuries, including $250,000 for vaccine-related deaths, with
awards paid out of a fund generated by an excise tax on vaccines.214
As a “quid pro quo” for the establishment of this no-fault regime,
however, the NCVIA provided “signiﬁcant tort-liability protec-
tions for vaccine manufacturers.”215 These protections include im-
munity for failure to warn so long as manufacturers comply with
regulatory requirements, a heightened standard of culpability for
punitive damages, and elimination of liability “for a vaccine’s un-
avoidable, adverse side effects.”216
Hannah Bruesewitz was vaccinated for diphtheria, tetanus, and
pertussis (DTP) in April 1992, when she was six months old. She
experienced over 100 seizures, beginning within twenty-four hours
of her vaccination. Hannah’s parents ﬁled a petition in the Court
of Federal Claims in 1995, alleging that Hannah suffered from
residual seizure disorder and encephalopathy injuries—disorders
listed in the NCIVA’s Vaccine Injury Table as compensable adverse
side effects of the DTP vaccine. When a Special Master denied
their claims, the Bruesewitzes ﬁled a common law tort suit in
Pennsylvania state court, alleging that the defective design of the
DTP vaccine caused Hannah’s injuries. Wyeth removed the case
to federal court, which held the Bruesewitzes’ claims preempted.217
Bruesewitz required the Court to decide whether the NCVIA’s
express preemption clause preempted state liability for defective
design claims. The relevant provision of the NCVIA provides that
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the ad-
ministration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine
213 See 42 USC §§ 300aa-11(a)(1), 12(d), (e), & (g), 21(a).
214 Id §§ 300aa-15(a), (i)(2); 26 USC §§ 4131, 9510.
215 131 S Ct at 1074.
216 Id.
217 See id at 1074–75.
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was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and
warnings.218
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, construed the
“even though” clause to “clarif[y] the word that precedes it”—that
is, it “delineates the preventative measures that a vaccine manu-
facturer must have taken for a side-effect to be considered ‘un-
avoidable’ under the statute.”219 This meant that “[p]rovided that
there was proper manufacture and warning, any remaining side
effects, including those resulting from design defects, are deemed
to have been unavoidable. State-law design-defect claims are
therefore preempted.”220
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Ginsburg) re-
jected this reading of the statute: “Given that the ‘even though’
clause requires the absence of manufacturing and labeling defects,
the ‘if ’ clause’s reference to ‘side effects that were unavoidable’
must refer to side effects caused by something other than man-
ufacturing and labeling defects.”221 She reasoned that “[t]he only
remaining kind of product defect recognized under traditional
products liability law is a design defect”;222 therefore, the statute’s
preemptive effect should be conﬁned to a subset of design defects
that are “unavoidable”—that is, “side effects stemming from the
vaccine’s design [that] could not have been prevented by a feasible
alternative design that would have eliminated the adverse side
effects without compromising the vaccine’s cost and utility.”223
The majority and dissent sparred at length over the proper
application of grammatical rules to the statutory text and the rel-
evance and import of the statute’s legislative history. Justice Breyer
wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize the importance of
“other sources, including legislative history, statutory purpose, and
the views of the federal administrative agency, here supported by
expert medical opinion.”224 In particular, he emphasized the FDA’s
218 42 USC § 300aa-22(b)(1).
219 131 S Ct at 1075.
220 Id.
221 Id at 1087 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
222 Id.
223 Id at 1093.
224 Id at 1083 (Breyer, J, concurring). Justice Kagan took no part in the decision of the
case.
7] PREEMPTION AND THE ROBERTS COURT 295
view that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted; it was important,
moreover, that “expert public health organizations support [the
FDA’s] views and the matter concerns a medical and scientiﬁc
question of great importance.”225 Under these circumstances,
Breyer suggested that deference was appropriate under Skidmore
v Swift & Co.226
d. at&t mobility llc v concepcion
In AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion,227 the Court considered
whether the Federal Arbitration Act228 (FAA) preempted a Cali-
fornia rule that conditioned the enforceability of certain arbitra-
tion agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration pro-
cedures. Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased AT&T
cellphone service in 2002. Although AT&T had advertised that
the service contract would include free phones, it charged them
$30.22 in sales tax based on the phones’ retail value. In 2006, the
Concepcions sued AT&T for false advertising and fraud in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The
district court later consolidated the Concepcions’ suit with a pu-
tative class action making similar allegations. AT&T moved to
compel arbitration under a provision of the service contract pro-
viding “for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but
requir[ing] that all claims be brought in the parties’ ‘individual
capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported
class or representative proceeding.’”229
Section 2 of the FAA makes arbitration agreements “valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”230 The provision
preempts state efforts to limit arbitration outright; it saves from
preemption “‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability,’ but not . . . defenses that apply only
225 Id at 1086.
226 Id, citing 323 US 134 (1944). Although Justice Breyer cited Skidmore, he did not
discuss why that level of deference was more appropriate than the more categorical def-
erence accorded to agency views under Chevron USA, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 US 837 (1984).
227 131 S Ct 1740 (2011).
228 9 USC § 2.
229 AT&T, 131 S Ct at 1744, quoting the contract.
230 9 USC § 2.
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to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”231 The question in Concepcion
was on which side of this line to place California’s doctrine of
unconscionability, as applied to class-action waivers in Discover
Bank v Superior Court.232 That case found class-action waivers to
be unconscionable “in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting
in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably in-
volve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme
to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individ-
ually small sums of money.”233 In such circumstances, Discover Bank
said, “the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party
‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another.’”234
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the Discover
Bank rule “interferes with arbitration” and was therefore pre-
empted under the FAA.235 Although the majority acknowledged
the existence of classwide arbitration procedures, it held that “the
switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacriﬁces the principal
advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass
than ﬁnal judgment.”236 Moreover, while “class arbitration greatly
increases risks to defendants” in much the same way as class lit-
igation (i.e., by aggregating claims), arbitration provides only ex-
tremely deferential judicial review for both certiﬁcation decisions
and ﬁnal judgments.237 “We ﬁnd it hard to believe,” Scalia wrote,
“that defendants would bet the company with no effective means
of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have
intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”238 Hence,
while parties remained free to agree to classwide arbitration, Cal-
ifornia’s effort to require such procedures was preempted.
As he had in Williamson, Justice Thomas concurred to urge that
231 131 S Ct at 1746, quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996).
232 113 P3d 1100 (Cal 2005).
233 Id at 1110.
234 Id, quoting Cal Civ Code § 1668 (West, 1984).
235 131 S Ct at 1750.
236 Id at 1751.
237 Id at 1752.
238 Id.
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preemption be grounded in the actual text of the statute rather
than on a conﬂict between state and federal law. “As I would read
it,” he said, “the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be
enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of
the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress.”239
He acknowledged, however, that this reading rested on a “not
obvious” distinction between “revocability” of a contract and chal-
lenges to a contract’s “validity and enforceability”—a distinction,
moreover, that “has not been fully developed by any party.”240
Noting that “when possible, it is important in interpreting statutes
to give lower courts guidance from a majority of the Court,”
Thomas provided a ﬁfth vote by “reluctantly join[ing] the Court’s
opinion” while “adher[ing] to my views on purposes-and-objec-
tives pre-emption.”241
Justice Breyer dissented in an opinion joined by the rest of the
Court’s liberal wing. He ﬁrst insisted that the “[t]he Discover Bank
rule is consistent with the federal Act’s language” because it “‘ap-
plies equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts without
arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in
conctracts with such agreements.’”242 He also argued that the Cal-
ifornia rule did not conﬂict with the FAA’s purpose of “‘ensur[ing]
judicial enforcement’ of arbitration agreements.”243 Debate cen-
tered on the extent to which class arbitration would, in fact, un-
dermine the purposes of arbitration—especially that of reducing
the cost and formality of litigation. The relevant comparison,
Breyer suggested, was not between “the complexity of class ar-
bitration [and] that of bilateral arbitration,” but rather “between
class arbitration and judicial class actions.” Relying on American
Arbitration Association statistics indicating that “‘class arbitration
proceedings take more time than the average commercial arbitra-
tion, but may take less time than the average class action in court,’”
Breyer concluded that the Discover Bank rule’s protection of class-
wide procedures would not undermine the FAA’s pro-arbitration
policy.244
239 Id at 1753 (Thomas, J, concurring).
240 Id at 1754.
241 Id.
242 Id at 1757 (Breyer, J, dissenting), quoting Discover Bank, 113 P3d at 1112.
243 131 S Ct at 1757, quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v Byrd, 470 US 213, 219 (1985).
244 131 S Ct at 1759–60, quoting Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus
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e. chamber of commerce v whiting
A ﬁnal case, Chamber of Commerce v Whiting,245 scrambled the
voting alignments from the Court’s other preemption decisions.
Reﬂecting widespread dissatisfaction with the rigor of federal en-
forcement efforts under the nation’s immigration laws, a number
of states have enacted laws to supplement federal immigration
enforcement.246 Public controversy has centered around Arizona’s
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB
1070),247 which requires state and local ofﬁcials to take various
steps to enforce the national immigration laws, with the general
import that those laws will be enforced more strictly in Arizona.248
The United States has sued to challenge SB 1070 on preemption
grounds, and the Supreme Court recently agreed to take up that
case in the present Term.249 Whiting, on the other hand, involved
a lesser-known Arizona statute, the Legal Arizona Workers Act
(LAWA),250 which focuses on employers who hire unauthorized
aliens. Although the relevant statutory regimes implicated by SB
1070 and the LAWA are meaningfully different, the Court’s de-
cision upholding the LAWA in Whiting may nonetheless fore-
shadow the Court’s approach to SB 1070.
The LAWA, which the Arizona legislature enacted in 2007,
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Stolt-Nielson S.A. v AnimalFeeds International Corp.,
OT 2009 No 08-1198, *24 (US ﬁled Sept 4, 2009).
245 131 S Ct 1968 (2011).
246 See, for example, United States v Arizona, 703 F Supp 2d 980, 985 (D Ariz 2010)
(citing “rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human trafﬁcking crimes, and
serious public safety concerns” as giving rise to state intervention). For examples of action
by other states, see Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011
Ala Acts 535, codiﬁed at Ala Code Ann §§ 31-13-1–30 (2011) (requiring ofﬁcers to verify
a person’s immigration status during trafﬁc stops or arrests if the ofﬁcer has a reasonable
suspicion that a person’s presence is not lawful); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act,
2011 Utah Laws Ch 21 (HB 497), codiﬁed at Utah Code Ann § 76-9-1001 et seq (2011)
(requiring ofﬁcers to verify the immigration status of persons arrested for certain mis-
demeanors and felonies, clarifying when an ofﬁcer should question passengers about their
immigration status, and giving grounds for a presumption of a person’s lawful presence);
Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, Ga Laws 252 (HB 87), codiﬁed
in various sections of Ga Code (authorizing ofﬁcers to investigate a suspect’s immigration
status if the ofﬁcer has probable cause).
247 2010 Ariz Legis Serv Ch 113 (West).
248 SB 1070 also creates certain related crimes under state law, most importantly, a crime
for an unauthorized alien to solicit, apply for, or perform work.
249 See Lyle Denniston, Another Landmark Ruling in the Ofﬁng (SCOTUSblog, Dec 12,
2011), online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/another-landmark-ruling-in-the-off-
ing/.
250 Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 23-211 et seq.
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“allows Arizona courts to suspend or revoke the licenses necessary
to do business in the State if an employer knowingly or inten-
tionally employs an unauthorized alien.”251 The law requires that
state ofﬁcials determine an individual’s status by seeking federal
veriﬁcation of citizenship or immigration status, pursuant to fed-
eral law, and forbids any independent determination of that status.
Likewise, employees may establish an afﬁrmative defense by show-
ing good-faith compliance with federal procedures for verifying
an individual’s eligibility for employment. Finally, state law re-
quires all employers to verify an employee’s eligibility by using
the “E-Verify” system, an internet-based federal database.252
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, along with
various business and civil rights organizations, challenged the
LAWA on preemption grounds. They argued, in particular, that
the Arizona law was expressly preempted by the federal Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),253 which established ex-
tensive federal regulation of the employment of unauthorized ali-
ens. The IRCA expressly preempts “any State or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing
and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for
a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”254 The primary ques-
tion in Whiting was whether Arizona’s law could escape express
preemption by ﬁtting into the category of “licensing and similar
laws.” The Chamber also argued that LAWA was impliedly pre-
empted because it conﬂicted with IRCA’s object and purpose, and
in particular that federal law impliedly preempted Arizona’s effort
to mandate the use of the federal E-Verify program.
Writing for the Court,255 Chief Justice Roberts began with the
statutory text: “When a federal law contains an express preemption
clause, we ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause, which nec-
251 131 S Ct at 1976.
252 See id at 1976–77 (summarizing the LAWA’s provisions).
253 Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (1986), codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections
of 8 USC.
254 8 USC § 1324a(h)(2).
255 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito joined the Chief ’s opinion in full. Justice Thomas
joined all but the portions dealing with obstacle preemption—presumably because he has
questioned the very legitimacy of obstacle preemption and thus wished to address only
arguments based on the statutory text. See Part III.B. Although the Reporter described
the Chief Justice’s opinion on the obstacle preemption issues as not being “of the Court,”
it is worth noting that he still spoke for a 4–3 majority on those points because Justice
Kagan was recused.
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essarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive in-
tent.’”256 “[O]n its face,” he noted, the Arizona law “purports to
impose sanctions through licensing laws,” and Arizona’s broad
deﬁnition of license was consistent with dictionary deﬁnitions of
the term, similar deﬁnitions in federal law, and the Court’s own
prior decisions.257 The Court thus concluded that “Arizona’s li-
censing law falls well within the conﬁnes of the authority Congress
chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly pre-
empted.”258
The Chief Justice then turned to the implied preemption ar-
guments. “At its broadest level,” he said, “the Chamber’s argument
is that Congress ‘intended the federal system to be exclusive,’ and
that any state system therefore necessarily conﬂicts with federal
law.”259 That argument, the majority found, was inconsistent with
the IRCA’s explicit language saving state licensing regimes.260
Moreover, the Chief Justice emphasized that “here Arizona went
the extra mile in ensuring that its law closely tracks IRCA’s pro-
visions in all material respects.”261 The LAWA adopted the federal
deﬁnition of unauthorized alien and required state investigators
to verify the work authorization of allegedly unauthorized aliens
with federal authorities; “[a]s a result, there can by deﬁnition be
no conﬂict between state and federal law as to worker authori-
zation, either at the investigatory or adjudicatory stage.”262 Like-
wise, the LAWA’s prohibitions on employment of unauthorized
aliens “trace the federal law” and provide employers “with the
same afﬁrmative defense for good-faith compliance with the I-9
process as does the federal law.”263
256 131 S Ct at 1977, quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664
(1993).
257 131 S Ct at 1977. The Chief Justice noted, moreover, that “even if a law regulating
articles of incorporation, partnership certiﬁcates, and the like is not itself a ‘licensing law,’
it is at the very least ‘similar’ to a licensing law, and therefore comfortably within the
savings clause.” Id at 1978.
258 Id at 1981.
259 Id, quoting Brief for the Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce v Candelaria, No 09-115,
*39 (US ﬁled Sept 1, 2010).
260 131 S Ct at 1981.
261 Id.
262 Id, citing Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 23-212(B), (H).
263 131 S Ct at 1982, citing Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 23-211(8), 212(J). Similarly, both the
state and federal law allowed employers “a rebuttable presumption of compliance” when
they use the E-Verify system. See 131 S Ct at 1982, citing Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 232-
212(I ).
7] PREEMPTION AND THE ROBERTS COURT 301
Critically, the Court rejected the notion that “the law is pre-
empted because it upsets the balance that Congress sought to
strike” between “deterring unauthorized alien employment, avoid-
ing burdens on employers, protecting employee privacy, and
guarding against employment discrimination.”264 Cases ﬁnding
such disruption, the Chief Justice observed, “all involve uniquely
federal areas of regulation”—such as foreign affairs, maritime law,
or fraud on a federal agency—while “[r]egulating in-state busi-
nesses through licensing laws has never been considered such an
area of dominant federal concern.”265 Likewise, “all [the cases re-
lied on by the Chamber] concern state actions that directly in-
terfered with the operation of the federal program.”266 The present
case, by contrast, involved no such interference, since Congress
had speciﬁcally carved out a state role and Arizona law reinforced,
rather than undermined, the IRCA’s prohibitions on discrimina-
tion.267 The Chief Justice emphasized that “[i]mplied preemption
analysis does not justify a ‘free-wheeling judicial inquiry into
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives,’” and
that “‘a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be pre-
empted for conﬂicting with the purposes of a federal Act.’”268
“That threshold,” the Court concluded, “is not met here.”269
Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Ginsburg) and Justice Soto-
mayor both dissented. Breyer thought that while the Arizona law
might ﬁt dictionary deﬁnitions of a “licensing” scheme, it was
inconsistent with the way that term was used in the IRCA: “or-
dinary corporate charters, certiﬁcates of partnership, and the like
264 Id at 1983.
265 Id (discussing American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003); Crosby
v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000); United States v Locke, 529 US 89
(2000); Buckman v Plaintiff ’s Legal Committee, 531 US 341 (2001); and Bonito Boats, Inc. v
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US 141 (1989)).
266 131 S Ct at 1983.
267 Id at 1983–84.
268 Id at 1985, quoting Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 US 88, 110,
111 (1992) (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and in judgment).
269 Id. The Chief Justice also rejected a narrower implied preemption argument, based
on the fact that Arizona law requires employers to use the E-Verify system while federal
law makes that system voluntary. He noted that the statute establishing E-Verify “contains
no language circumscribing state action,” id, and that “the Federal Government has con-
sistently expanded and encouraged the use of E-Verify.” Id at 1986. The Court rejected
concerns about state-imposed burdens on the system and about the system’s accuracy,
noting that the United States had assured the Court of the system’s adequacy on both
counts. See id.
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do not fall within the scope of the word ‘licensing’ as used in this
federal exception.”270 Moreover, Breyer argued that the LAWA
disrupted the balance Congress struck between the competing
goals of federal immigration law. This was so because the state
law increased the penalties for hiring an unauthorized alien in
such a way as to outstrip federal penalties for discrimination, so
that employers would have incentives to err on the side of not
hiring “foreign-looking” persons.271 The LAWA likewise “subjects
lawful employers to increased burdens and risks of erroneous pros-
ecution,” particularly because of inaccuracies in the E-Verify sys-
tem.272 Breyer would thus have read the IRCA’s “licensing” lan-
guage more narrowly, “as limited in scope to laws licensing
businesses that recruit or refer workers for employment.”273
Also dissenting, Justice Sotomayor read the IRCA’s saving lan-
guage even more narrowly, “to preserve States’ authority to impose
licensing sanctions after a ﬁnal federal determination that a person
has violated IRCA by knowingly employing an unauthorized
alien.”274 In other words, states may act only after federal au-
thorities have determined that an employer is in violation of fed-
eral law. Although she read the savings clause differently than
Justice Breyer, Sotomayor largely echoed his concerns that Ari-
zona’s scheme would undermine uniform federal enforcement of
the immigration laws.275
f. an incoherent doctrine?
At the end of his dissent in Concepcion, Justice Breyer harkened
back to his admonition in Egelhoff that “the true test of federalist
principle” occurs in preemption cases.276 Implicitly invoking the
conservative Justices’ paeans to state sovereignty in cases like
270 Id at 1988 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
271 Id at 1990.
272 Id at 1990–91.
273 Id at 1995. Justice Breyer would likewise have held that the state law’s mandate to
use E-Verify was impliedly preempted. See id at 1995–97.
274 Id at 1998 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting) (emphasis added).
275 See id at 1999–2005. Justice Sotomayor likewise agreed with Justice Breyer that
Arizona could not mandate the use of E-Verify. Id at 2005–07.
276 See text accompanying note 6.
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United States v Lopez and Alden v Maine,277 Breyer noted that “fed-
eralism is as much a question of deeds as words. It often takes the
form of a concrete decision by this Court that respects the legit-
imacy of a State’s action in an individual case.”278 The Court’s
deeds in the 2010 Term, however, do not lend themselves to easy
summation. This is true for a variety of reasons, some intrinsic to
the nature of preemption cases and others contingent on the di-
vision of opinion on the current Court.
As Justice Breyer suggested in Egelhoff, preemption analysis oc-
curs “at retail . . . statute by statute, line by line.”279 Sometimes
Congress really does intend to preempt state law, and sometimes
it doesn’t; in the cases that reach the Supreme Court, typically by
generating a split among the lower courts, Congress’s intent is
ambiguous almost by deﬁnition. If the Court were to impose very
strong default rules—a super-strong version of the Rice presump-
tion against preemption, for example—then we might expect all
these intermediate cases to go one way or the other. But the default
rules have never been that strong, nor is it clear that they should
be. In the absence of heavy-handed defaults, any court deciding
a series of preemption cases arising under a variety of different
statutes that say different things and invoke different purposes is
going to ﬁnd preemption in some cases and reject it in others.280
The different outcomes in Wyeth and PLIVA, for instance, reﬂect
that the regulatory regimes for brand-name and generic drugs are
meaningfully different in respects relevant to the preemption ques-
tion.281
277 See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 552 (1995) (citing as a constitutional “ﬁrst
principle[]” the need to maintain “a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government”); Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 713 (1999) (emphasizing “the vital
role reserved to the States by the constitutional design”).
278 131 S Ct at 1762 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
279 532 US at 160 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
280 See Richard A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context 1,
19, in Epstein and Greve, eds, Federal Preemption (cited in note 44), at 19 (“The con-
gressional intent baseline raises the specter that preemption law can only be as coherent
as the statutory universe on which it operates.”).
281 See, for example, PLIVA, 131 S Ct at 2582 (“It is beyond dispute that the federal
statutes and regulations that apply to brand-name drug manufacturers are meaningfully
different than those that apply to generic drug manufacturers.”). Similarly, Wyeth’s decision
that federal approval of a drug does not preempt state common law actions seems incon-
sistent with Riegel v Medtronic, 552 US 312 (2008), which held that federal approval of a
medical device does preempt state tort suits. But as Justice Stevens explained in Wyeth,
“when Congress enacted an express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976
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The divergent outcomes in the Court’s preemption cases last
Term thus do not necessarily signify a jurisprudence that is in-
coherent, confused, or unprincipled.282 To be sure, there are frus-
trating inconsistencies: In Whiting, for example, the politics of
immigration may seem to have induced most of the Justices to
reverse their usual stance on preemption matters. But politics does
not tell the whole story.283 Even where the divergent results cannot
be traced, as in PLIVA and Wyeth, to the underlying statutes, it
hardly follows that the Justices have thrown neutral principles out
the window. Rather, multiple neutral principles—concerning both
methodology and constitutional structure—may bear on preemp-
tion cases, and their relative importance plausibly may vary across
cases. For the Whiting dissenters, for example, principles of avoid-
ing discrimination based on ethnicity or preserving federal pri-
macy in foreign affairs may have seemed more immediately at issue
than principles of federalism. Each of these values is grounded in
the Constitution, and each might plausibly be called upon to re-
solve a close case of statutory construction. To say that one could
have weighed these principles differently—as the majority did in
Whiting—is not to say that there was no principled basis for com-
ing out where the dissenters did. And to say that we need a more
foundational principle for choosing among competing values in
such cases is simply to restate the fundamental problem of con-
stitutional law.
As I have already discussed, the Justices ﬁnd themselves divided
on at least two sets of legal questions that arise in nearly all pre-
emption cases: What counts as preemption? And who can preempt
state law? Both sets of issues raise questions along three dimen-
. . . it declined to enact such a provision for prescription drugs.” 555 US at 567. These
statutory differences turn out to matter a great deal.
282 See, for example, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More
Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity? 45 Tulsa L Rev 197, 197 (2000) (“The law of preemption
. . . is infamous for its vagueness and unpredictability.”); Pursley, 71 Ohio St L J at 515
(cited in note 9) (“Judicial preemption doctrine is thin and confusing.”). Law professors
love to say that this or that area of law is “incoherent” or “confused.” See Young, 83 Tex
L Rev at 11 n 41 (cited in note 47) (collecting citations to academics concluding that this
or that ﬁeld is “incoherent”). The fact that we say it so often, and about so many different
doctrinal areas, suggests that a certain amount of disorder is inherent in any complex
human construct like the law. In any event, there is no reason to believe that the Court’s
preemption jurisprudence is more confused than, say, its privacy or equal protection ju-
risprudence.
283 For one thing, it is far from obvious what we mean by “politics” when we talk about
judicial decisions. See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the
“Federalist Revival” after Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Supreme Court Review 1, 18–20.
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sions. The ﬁrst dimension concerns the proper interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause—in particular, the sort of conﬂict between
state and federal law required before preemption must occur, and
whether the Supremacy Clause forecloses a presumption against
preemption. A second dimension is more methodological in na-
ture, implicating broader debates about the relative importance in
statutory construction of statutory text, legislative history, inter-
pretive canons, the views of federal administrative agencies, and
straight-up policy arguments. And, ﬁnally, the third dimension
raises basic questions of separation of powers—not just which fed-
eral entities have the power to preempt state laws, but also whose
views count as to whether preemption has occurred. These di-
mensions obviously overlap; the question of interpretive meth-
odology, for example, implicates fundamental separation-of-pow-
ers concerns about the relationship between courts and other
governmental actors. But distinguishing the broader dimensions
of the Court’s preemption disputes should spotlight the connec-
tion between those disputes and broader debates in public law.
Each individual Justice confronts these central questions of pre-
emption doctrine, but the difﬁculty of developing coherent an-
swers is compounded by the multimember nature of the Court.
Some of the Justices have staked out clear positions on some of
these issues, but not others, and other Justices remain uncom-
mitted on most of them. For example, Justice Thomas has de-
veloped in recent years a distinctive and principled approach to
preemption that stakes out a position on almost all of the relevant
questions. Justice Breyer has likewise articulated a largely coherent
theoretical position that, although allowing judges considerably
more ﬂexibility than Thomas’s view, nonetheless at least has some-
thing to say about each of the relevant doctrinal and methodo-
logical issues. Outcomes in individual cases, however, are largely
a function of where the less committed Justices fall. And even
when these Justices sign on to a more theoretically ambitious opin-
ion, they seem to feel relatively unconstrained to follow that theory
in future cases. That is why, at least for now, preemption doctrine
remains somewhat in ﬂux.
It is not obvious that there should be a coherent body of “pre-
emption doctrine”—that is, doctrine that is not a function of the
particular regulatory ﬁeld at issue. William Eskridge, for example,
has argued that “the larger project of preemption jurisprudence
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is to develop area-speciﬁc precepts for calibrating the state-federal
balance.”284 To some extent, area-speciﬁc doctrine is inevitable.
Preemption stems from Congress’s intent, which varies from stat-
ute to statute, and as the Court decides a series of cases under a
particular statute, the Court will likely develop an area-speciﬁc
picture of Congress’s intent under that statute. The Court has
thus interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act and the National Bank
Act as broadly preempting state law,285 while construing the regime
governing new medical drugs as leaving an important role for state
tort regulation.286
My own view, however, is that preemption questions are too
critical to the overall balance of our federalism to leave them as
matters of “ordinary” statutory construction, unconnected to the
broader themes of national power and state autonomy. Our con-
stitutional system has always left much, if not most, of the insti-
tutional architecture of federalism to be worked out through or-
dinary legislation; hence, federal statutes, administrative
regulations, institutional practices, and judge-made doctrines play
a greater role in deﬁning the balance of state and federal power
than do the entrenched provisions of the canonical constitution.
As I have already discussed, the enumerated limits of Congress’s
powers now play an extremely limited role in preserving the federal
balance, and preemption has become the central question of our
federalism. It is critical to approach preemption questions in ways
that cohere with the broader concerns of constitutional federalism
doctrine.287 The next part discusses the ways in which the Court
has set about that task.
284 Eskridge, 83 Notre Dame L Rev at 1485 (cited in note 123). For examples, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and
Default Rules, in Epstein and Greve, eds, Federal Preemption at 166 (cited in note 44);
Sharkey, 76 Geo Wash L Rev at 449 (cited in note 95).
285 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp., 460 US 1, 24–25
(1983) (stating that the FAA announces “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary,” and
“create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the Act”); Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v Nelson,
517 US 25, 32 (1996) (observing that, in the banking area, the Court’s “history is one of
interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants
of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state
law”).
286 See Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555 (2009).
287 See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An
Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 Cal L Rev 1371 (2010) (arguing that because statutes ﬂesh out
the constitutional structure, constitutional values should inform statutory construction).
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III. The Presumption Against Preemption
In theory, at least, the centerpiece of modern preemption
doctrine remains the Court’s statement in Rice v Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.288 that “we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Just
three years ago, in Wyeth, the Court described the Rice presump-
tion as a “cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence.”289 Not-
withstanding this and similar endorsements, many scholars have
noted the Court’s failure to consistently employ the Rice canon.290
The 2010 Term was no exception to this tendency: The Justices
ignored Rice in Williamson and Concepcion and invoked it only in
dissent in PLIVA and Bruesewitz.291 In Whiting, the majority looked
only to the “plain wording” of the express preemption clause, but
imposed a “high threshold” for ﬁnding conﬂict preemption.292
The unreliability of this presumption is nothing new: In Rice
itself, the Court ﬁrst articulated its strong anti-preemption pre-
sumption, but then went on to ﬁnd ﬁeld preemption based on a
relatively weak showing of Congress’s intent.293 The presumption
against preemption has become particularly controversial in recent
years. On the one hand, some scholars (this one included) have
developed theoretical accounts situating the Rice presumption
within federalism doctrine as well as within the broader context
288 331 US 218, 230 (1947).
289 555 US at 565.
290 See, for example, Merrill, 102 Nw U L Rev at 741 (cited in note 102) (“[T]he
presumption against preemption is honored as much in the breach as in observance.”);
Rosen, 102 Nw U L Rev at 785 (cited in note 101) (observing that the presumption “is
only inconsistently invoked and applied”). Some commentators go so far as to say that
“the Supreme Court’s recent preemption decisions . . . [have], in effect, created a pre-
sumption in favor of preemption.” Davis, 53 SC L Rev at 971 (cited in note 78) (emphasis
added).
291 See PLIVA, 131 S Ct at 2586 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting); Bruesewitz, 131 S Ct at
1096 n 15 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting). Williamson is the most surprising, because the Court
rejected preemption without invoking Rice. But the Court may have felt that the circum-
stances of the case were so close to Geier that the only issues concerned the differences
between the regulations at issue in the two cases. It is plausible that general presumptions
would have little impact on such a granular question.
292 131 S Ct at 1977, 1985.
293 See 331 US at 232–36. Richard Epstein and Michael Greve are thus right to question
whether Rice really did what it is generally cited for. See Epstein and Greve, Conclusion
at 315 (cited in note 67). That hardly undermines the authority of subsequent decisions’
application of a real presumption against preemption, however.
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of statutory and constitutional interpretive methodology.294 On the
other hand, the presumption has also come under attack from
litigants and academics. Parties and their amici before the Court
have repeatedly called for the Court to abandon Rice explicitly,
both in express and implied preemption cases,295 and the Court’s
reafﬁrmation of Rice in Altria and Wyeth is unlikely to discourage
further attacks for long.
One question that arises at the outset is what to make of the
Court’s failure to invoke Rice in many of the cases in which it
might seem to apply. Dissenting Justices in Altria and Wyeth in-
voked these omissions to argue that Rice is no longer—if it ever
was—good law.296 To my mind, however, Justice Thomas himself
provided the appropriate answer to this sort of argument in Wyeth,
where he said that “[b]ecause it is evident from the text of the
relevant federal statutes and regulations themselves that the state-
law judgment below is not pre-empted, it is not necessary to decide
whether, or to what extent, the presumption should apply in a
case such as this one, where Congress has not enacted an express
pre-emption clause.”297 In other words, when the Justices think
that the preemption question is not a close one, they often choose
not to invoke Rice’s tiebreaker rule. This is true both when the
Court does and does not ﬁnd preemption. The Court’s approach
294 See, for example, Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 130–34 (cited in note 47); Gardbaum, 79
Cornell L Rev at 767 (cited in note 55).
295 See note 111; see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Georgetown
L J 2085, 2092 (2000) (attacking Rice); Untereiner, 84 Tulane L Rev 1265–68 (cited in
note 11) (same).
296 In Altria, for example, Justice Thomas cited the following express preemption cases
that failed to refer to any presumption against preemption: Sprietsma v Mercury Marine,
537 US 51 (2002); Rose v New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, 552 US 364 (2008);
Engine Manufacturers Association v South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 US 246
(2004); Buckman Co. v Plaintiffs’ Legal Commission, 531 US 341 (2001); United States v
Locke, 529 US 89 (2000); and Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861 (2000). He
acknowledged that the Court had invoked it in Medtronic, Inc. v Loht, 518 US 470 (1996);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 US 525 (2001); and Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544
US 431 (2005), but observed that Lohr was a “fractured decision,” 555 US at 99, and
asserted that Lorillard and Bates did not in fact rely on the presumption even though they
found no preemption, id at 100–101. Most important, Thomas thought that Riegel v
Medtronic, Inc., 552 US 312 (2008), resolved any doubts: “[g]iven the [Riegel ] dissent’s
clear call for the use of the presumption against pre-emption, the Court’s decision not to
invoke it was necessarily a rejection of any role for the presumption in construing the
statute.” 555 US at 102. See also Wyeth, 555 US at 623–24 (Alito, J, dissenting) (discussing
Geier and Buckman).
297 555 US at 589 n 2 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
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may well be a form of “incompletely theorized agreement”298—
after all, why undermine consensus on a result by invoking a pres-
ently controversial argument when one can resolve the case with-
out it?299 Just as William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have shown
that the Court frequently fails to invoke Chevron in cases in which
it might apply,300 so too the Court’s avoidance of Rice may signify
little about whether Rice’s interpretive presumption remains good
law.
It is not clear that the Court’s stance on Rice represents a stable
equilibrium, however, and it is worth examining the arguments
advanced against a presumption against preemption and the extent
to which particular Justices have taken those arguments up. Much
of the debate about Rice is really a skirmish in the broader war
between reliance on the “plain meaning” of statutory text and
recourse to extrinsic tools like the canons of construction. What
Justice Scalia once said of Chevron is likely true of Rice as well: If
one generally believes that texts are clear, then one has less oc-
casion to rely on interpretive rules and presumptions that aid in
construing ambiguous statutes.301 One can read Scalia’s unwill-
ingness to invoke Rice in Bruesewitz, for example, as a rejection of
extrinsic sources of statutory meaning in general, not simply as
an attack on a particular rule of construction in preemption
cases.302
The 2010 Term also featured two more speciﬁc debates about
the standard for preemption, however. One concerned an academic
argument advanced by Caleb Nelson about the original under-
298 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev
1733 (1995).
299 See, for example, Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 374 n 8 (2000)
(declining to address the controversial question whether Rice should apply in foreign
relations cases, stating that “[w]e leave for another day a consideration in this context of
a presumption against preemption”).
300 See William N. Eskridge Jr. and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Georgetown
L J 1083, 1090 (2008) (ﬁnding “that the Court usually does not apply Chevron to cases
that are, according to Mead and other opinions, Chevron-eligible”). Few seem to infer
from this that Chevron is no longer good law.
301 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L J 511, 521 (“One who ﬁnds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby ﬁnds less often
that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”).
302 See also Cipollone, 505 US at 544 (Scalia, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Under the Supremacy Clause, our job is to interpret Congress’s decrees of pre-emption
neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their apparent meaning.”).
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standing of the Supremacy Clause,303 which has important impli-
cations for both the Rice presumption and the proper approach to
conﬂict preemption. This argument has particularly inﬂuenced
Justice Thomas,304 who has developed the most fully theorized
approach to preemption among the current Justices, as well as
prominent advocates of broad federal preemption.305 The second
debate concerns the extent to which the Court should analyze
preemption differently in different regulatory ﬁelds—in particular,
whether the Rice presumption should be conﬁned to ﬁelds of tra-
ditional state primacy, while other rules should govern areas like
immigration and foreign affairs where the national government
has taken a leading role. Sections A and B of this part address the
Nelson argument as it pertains to Rice and to conﬂict preemption,
respectively. Section C considers the subject-matter scope of the
presumption against preemption.
a. non obstante, part 1—challenging rice
In an important article published just over a decade ago,306 Caleb
Nelson challenged much of contemporary preemption doctrine as
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Supremacy
Clause. That Clause provides that the Constitution, treaties, and
federal statutes “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.”307 Professor Nelson argues that the last phrase would have
been understood by the Founding generation as a non obstante
clause. These clauses were frequently employed to overcome the
ordinary presumption against implied repeals of prior law.308 He
asserts that Rice’s presumption against preemption is inconsistent
with this understanding: “A general rule that express preemption
clauses should be read ‘narrowly’ . . . is hard to square with the
303 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225 (2000).
304 See, for example, 131 S Ct at 2579 (plurality opinion) (endorsing Nelson’s view on
conﬂict preemption).
305 See, for example, Untereiner, 84 Tulane L Rev at 1267–68 (cited in note 11) (en-
dorsing Nelson’s critique of Rice).
306 See Nelson, 86 Va L Rev 225 (cited in note 303).
307 US Const, Art VI, cl 2.
308 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 237–44 (cited in note 303).
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Supremacy Clause’s non obstante provision.”309 Nelson’s argu-
ment adds a valuable historical perspective to the preemption de-
bate, and I embrace a number of his conclusions here. I do not
believe, however, that he provides a persuasive argument for aban-
doning Rice.310
The Court did not confront Professor Nelson’s argument
against Rice directly in the 2010 Term. It did debate his claim that
the Supremacy Clause must be read as a non obstante provision,
but in the distinct context of implied preemption. And the Court’s
express preemption decision in Bruesewitz seemed to reﬂect some
implicit skepticism about Rice by simply avoiding citing it. The
remainder of this section addresses Nelson’s argument against Rice
on its merits, while Section B considers the likelihood that the
Court will ultimately accept it.
1. The strength and nature of the Rice presumption. As an initial
matter, it is not clear that Professor Nelson means to reject the
presumption against preemption as the Court has actually applied
it. He notes that “[o]ne should not take [his critique of Rice] too
far,”311 and he has no quarrel with the proposition that “judges
should generally be ‘reluctant to infer pre-emption.’”312 Nelson’s
analysis thus provides no support for industry groups that have
argued for “a presumption in favor of preemption.”313 It seems
fair to read his argument as foreclosing only a strong clear state-
ment requirement for preemption—a presumption that, as Judge
Wald once put it, “Congress did not intend to interfere with the
traditional power and authority of the states unless it signaled its
intention in neon lights.”314
Any such “neon lights” requirement would be far more rigid
than the way the Court has traditionally applied Rice.315 Professor
309 Id at 293.
310 My argument in this section relies substantially on points made in an amicus brief
that I ﬁled on behalf of a group of constitutional and administrative law scholars in Wyeth
v Levine. Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars in Sup-
port of Respondent, Wyeth v Levine, No 06-1249, *9–14 (US Aug 14, 2008).
311 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 294 (cited in note 303).
312 Id at 293, quoting Exxon Corp. v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117, 132 (1978).
313 Brief of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in Support of Pe-
titioner at *15 (cited in note 111).
314 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 209 (1983).
315 See, for example, Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against
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Nelson’s point seems better read as a corrective to the danger,
identiﬁed by Professor Shapiro, that any interpretive canon “will
constitute both the starting and the ending point of analysis rather
than serving as a helpful tool in resolving difﬁcult cases.”316 But
as long as courts do not apply Rice “in a way that subordinates
other sources of information” about legislative intent—that is, so
long as they do not transform it into a strong clear statement
requirement—this danger does not arise.317 None of last Term’s
preemption cases used Rice to exclude other sources of statutory
meaning, and most of the cases ignored it entirely. The problem
is that Rice is overlooked, not over-read.
At times, Professor Nelson seems to limit his anti-Rice argument
to express preemption cases—that is, to cases in which Congress
explicitly has dealt with the question of preemption.318 It is fair
to read his point as sweeping somewhat more broadly, however,
to challenge any rule of construction that encourages courts to
“strain the federal law’s meaning in order to harmonize it with
state law.”319 Nelson rejects the idea “that judges have a general
Implied Repeals, 92 Cal L Rev 487, 520 (2004) (noting that “the presumption against
preemption does not enjoy the near-categorical status that the presumption against implied
repeals currently does on the Supreme Court”). Professor Nelson also acknowledges that,
given the placement of the semicolon in the Supremacy Clause, “the non obstante provision
might have been directed especially at state judges,” Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 260 (cited
in note 303)—not at the federal courts. But see id at 258–59 (arguing that the Framers
played fast and loose with punctuation).
316 Shapiro, 67 NYU L Rev at 956 (cited in note 52). Professor Nelson conﬁrms this
point when he acknowledges that “most of us view genuinely ambiguous statutory language
as a delegation to the courts of authority to pick one interpretation from among the group
of interpretations that are best,” Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 296 (cited in note 303), and that
“[m]ost of the time, of course, Congress will leave courts free to take account of state
interests when exercising their delegated authority,” id at 298. He insists only that “courts
[must] apply the presumption only after they have used whatever tools our theory of
statutory interpretation permits,” id at 296, and that “judges do not have complete dis-
cretion to base their selection [of an otherwise permissible interpretation] on whatever
factors they like,” id at 297. Nelson thus rejects only a categorical presumption that would
“permit courts to base the decision entirely on [federalism] concerns,” id at 298 (emphasis
in original). I, for one, have never seen a Supreme Court decision that rested “entirely”
on the Rice presumption.
317 Shapiro, 67 NYU L Rev at 957–58 (cited in note 52); see also id at 958 (noting that
strong “clear statement” rules “exclude the kind of purposive analysis that permits a court
to ﬁnd a result implicit in a statutory enactment”); see also Clark, Process-Based Preemption,
in Buzbee, ed, Preemption Choice 208–09 (cited in note 8) (construing Professor Nelson’s
argument as objecting primarily to a strong clear statement approach to the presumption
against preemption).
318 See text accompanying note 309; see also Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 292 (cited in note
303).
319 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 255 (cited in note 303).
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obligation to harmonize federal law with whatever state law hap-
pens to exist.”320 He targets cases like Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v Ware, which have stated that “the proper approach [in
preemption cases] is to reconcile ‘the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely
ousted.’”321 In Nelson’s view, “[u]nless there is some particular
reason (over and above the general presumption against implied
repeals) to believe that Congress meant to avoid such a contra-
diction, the Supremacy Clause indicates that the content of state
law should not alter the meaning of federal law.”322
This aspect of Professor Nelson’s view seems to require little,
if any, departure from current doctrine. In express preemption
cases, preemption doctrine is, in Professor Rosen’s terms, wholly
“unilateralist”—courts construe what law Congress intended to
preempt and do not place any countervailing value on state law.323
And even in implied conﬂicts cases, where courts may deem some
minor level of conﬂict tolerable for the sake of preserving state
authority, courts do not generally “weigh” federal interests against
state ones. Nor do they “harmonize” state and federal law in the
sense of compromising each to attain some consensus norm.324
The Rice presumption itself is a tool for discerning the content of
federal law and whether that law conﬂicts with state regulation. As
Louise Weinberg has said, we should not “suppos[e] that the pre-
sumption in favor of state law operates in cases of identiﬁed ‘actual’
federal-state conﬂict. Identiﬁcation of a federal-state conﬂict-in-
fact is, precisely, what overcomes the presumption.”325
Congress’s intent controls, however, as to the sorts of state reg-
ulation that conﬂict with the federal regulatory scheme. Many
preemption decisions reﬂect the fact that Congress often intends
for state and federal regulation to operate cooperatively within
the same ﬁeld—a possibility for which Nelson allows (as he must).
320 Id at 292.
321 414 US 117, 127 & n 8 (1973), quoting Silver v New York Stock Exchange, 373 US
341, 357 (1963).
322 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 256 (cited in note 303).
323 Rosen, 102 Nw U L Rev at 785 (cited in note 101).
324 See sources cited in note 100.
325 Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conﬂict of Laws: “Actual” Conﬂicts, 70 Tex L Rev
1743, 1756 (1992).
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The objectionable language in Merrill Lynch, for example, required
the Court to “reconcile” state and federal law precisely because
“Congress, in the securities ﬁeld, has not adopted a regulation
system wholly apart from and exclusive of state regulation. Instead,
Congress intended to subject the exchanges to state regulation
that is not inconsistent with the federal Act.”326
One might go beyond Merrill Lynch’s speciﬁc-intent situation
in two senses, however. The ﬁrst would be to suggest that Con-
gress should always be read as intending to preserve state regu-
latory authority, in the absence of some clear expression of intent
to the contrary. Such a general presumption may be justiﬁable on
purely descriptive grounds—that is, as the most likely description
of Congress’s actual intent.327 Several commentators have observed
that Congress’s general tendency when it enters a regulatory ﬁeld
is to leave concurrent state regulatory authority in place.328 Pro-
fessor Nelson seems to accept this aspect of Rice when he allows
that “judges should generally be ‘reluctant to infer pre-emp-
tion.’”329
Justice Souter proposed a second and perhaps somewhat stron-
ger version of Rice when he asserted that “[i]f the [federal] statute’s
terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-emptive effect, the
presumption controls and no pre-emption may be inferred.”330
326 414 US at 137. Speciﬁcally, the Court noted that “Section 6(c), 15 U. S. C. § 78f
(c), explicitly subjects exchange rules to a requirement of consistency with the Act ‘and
the applicable laws of the State in which [the exchange] is located.’” See also id at 138 n
16 (noting that “[t]he Act contains other provisions indicating the intent of Congress that
state law continues to apply where the Act itself does not”).
327 See, for example, Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You? 45 Vand L Rev 562, 563 (1991) (“Descriptive canons
are principles that involve predictions as to what the legislature must have meant, or
probably meant, by employing particular statutory language. . . . In contrast, normative
canons are principles . . . that do not purport to describe accurately what Congress actually
intended or what the words of a statute mean, but rather direct courts to construe any
ambiguity in a particular way in order to further some policy objective.” (footnotes
omitted)).
328 See Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony at 41 (cited in note 8) (“Since 1937, over-
lapping state and federal regulation has become the norm for many, if not most, subjects.”);
Robert R. M. Verchick and Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in
Buzbee, ed, Preemption Choice 13, 15 (cited in note 8) (“Congress regularly legislates to
share power or to preserve state authority.”).
329 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 293 (cited in note 303), quoting Exxon Corp. v Governor of
Maryland, 437 US 117, 132 (1978).
330 Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 US 88, 116–17 (1992) (Souter,
J, dissenting).
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This view, which has not (to my knowledge) been embraced in so
many words by a majority of the Court, requires a court to choose
the interpretation of ambiguous federal laws that best accom-
modates state regulatory efforts. This is probably where Professor
Nelson would jump off the train, arguing that the meaning of a
non obstante clause is to foreclose this sort of harmonization. It is
not clear, however, that Justice Souter’s formulation of Rice is really
much of a step. As I discuss in the next section, any interpretive
presumption that is not simply ornamental will have this sort of
effect.
2. The Supremacy Clause and canonical construction. Even a soft
presumption like Rice is not simply a tool for divining Congress’s
intent. What Justice Marshall said of “[c]lear-statement rules”—
that they “operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than
to shield important values from an insufﬁciently strong legislative
intent to displace them”331—is also true of Rice. Some critics of
the Supreme Court’s clear statement rules have suggested that it
is illegitimate for courts to apply “normative” canons protecting
state autonomy.332 Viet Dinh has extended this complaint to the
presumption against preemption, arguing that it encourages judges
to “rewrite the laws enacted by Congress.”333 For Professor Dinh,
any interpretive rule not designed simply “to discern what Con-
gress has legislated and whether such legislation displaces con-
current state law,” risks “an illegitimate expansion of the judicial
function.”334 At times, Professor Nelson appears to echo this crit-
icism. That critique, however, runs counter to established
traditions in our law of statutory construction.
All interpretive presumptions require, to varying degrees, that
courts set aside the interpretation of a statute that would otherwise
331 EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co., 499 US 244, 262 (1991) (Marshall, J, dissenting).
332 See Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 593, 632–45 (cited in note 53) (arguing
that “the Court . . . is creating a domain of ‘quasi-constitutional law’ in certain areas”);
Manning, 110 Colum L Rev at 404 (cited in note 84) (arguing that the federalism canons
depend on abstract values of federalism, but that “[v]alues such as federalism . . . do not
exist in freestanding form” in the Constitution). Professor Manning’s thoughtful critique
of “freestanding federalism” is largely beyond the scope of this essay. I note only that it
would call into question not only canons of statutory construction like the Rice presump-
tion, but also other doctrines based on broad notions of federalism, such as the judicial
abstention and anti-commandeering doctrines. It would also require rejecting many other
principles predicated on freestanding structural values, such as federal sovereign immunity
and functionalist doctrines of separation of powers.
333 Dinh, 88 Georgetown L J at 2092 (cited in note 295).
334 Id.
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be most likely (in view of the other sources of statutory meaning)
in favor of some less likely reading. Professor Nelson seems to
suggest that Rice should control only where the court is in equi-
poise between two interpretations of a federal statute, only one
of which would preempt state law.335 But there are very few “ties”
in statutory interpretation.336 And assuming that the plausible in-
terpretations are not actually equal, Rice’s presumption will matter
only in those cases in which it prompts a court to choose the less
likely reading; otherwise, the presumption does no independent
work.337 The function of an interpretive canon is thus to allow
certain extrinsic elements—rules of linguistic usage, constitutional
and subconstitutional values—to shape statutory construction.
When Justice Souter says that Rice should counsel courts to choose
nonpreemptive readings of federal statutes over preemptive ones,
he is simply being speciﬁc about the traditional and utterly typical
operation of interpretive presumptions.
The operation of such rules is foundational to the role of courts
in statutory construction. Many commentators have pointed out
that “[a]s applied to novel or unanticipated circumstances, all laws
are more or less indeterminate,” so that “courts necessarily engage
in some degree of interstitial norm elaboration.”338 James Madison
recognized as much in The Federalist:
335 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 265 (cited in note 303); see also John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev 1, 123 (2001) (criticizing clear statement
rules to the extent that they “sometimes require judges to reject the most natural reading
of a statute in favor of a plausible but less conventional interpretation”).
336 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Supreme Court Re-
view 71, 83 (“It is hard to imagine a case in which . . . there would be two identically
plausible interpretations, such that . . . the rational judge would be reduced to something
akin to tossing a coin.”). Justice Scalia has said much the same thing about Chevron,
observing that its interpretive rule “becomes virtually meaningless . . . if ambiguity exists
only when the arguments for and against the various possible interpretations are in absolute
equipoise. If nature knows of such equipoise in legal arguments, the courts at least do
not.” Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 520 (cited in note 301). He concludes that “[i]f Chevron
is to have any meaning, then, congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not
just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any other, but rather when two
or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist.” Id.
337 Justice Scalia and certain less august commentators have made a similar point about
the constitutional avoidance canon. See Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224,
270 (1998) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance); Ernest
A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review,
78 Tex L Rev 1549, 1577–78 (2000) (same).
338 Clark, Process-Based Preemption at 205 (cited in note 79); see also Amanda L. Tyler,
Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw U L Rev 1389, 1404 (2005) (“No one can
debate seriously the need for some default rules in statutory construction. Indeed, courts
consistently are called upon to make sense of ambiguous statutory language and to plug
7] PREEMPTION AND THE ROBERTS COURT 317
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed
on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and as-
certained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.339
Eschewing the use of interpretive canons or presumptions in favor
of relying on the “plain text”—as the majority purported to do
last Term in Bruesewitz, for example340—thus risks submerging the
courts’ actual rationale for decision. If courts do not simply employ
default rules without acknowledgment, they will need to recur
either to increasingly attenuated sources of congressional intent
or to their own policy judgments. Neither of those options is likely
to appeal to textualists. The canons have at least the virtue of
articulating the tiebreaker rules in play, so that they may be dis-
cussed and defended. As Amanda Tyler has recognized, “[t]he real
question is what default rules we should have where the formal
evidence of congressional purpose—i.e., statutory enactment—
leaves us shorthanded.”341
Professor Nelson concedes that the non obstante language in the
Clause is directed only at the generic presumption against implied
repeals. “While the non obstante provision tells courts not to apply
the general presumption against implied repeals in preemption
cases,” he says, “it does not require them to discard their other
tools of statutory interpretation.”342 Those tools include, as I have
already suggested, an awareness that concurrent regulation—not
wholesale ouster of the states—is the dominant pattern of con-
temporary national policy. They also include the basic proposition
that “[n]ew statutes ﬁt into the normal operation of the legal
system unless the political branches provide otherwise”343 and the
concomitant role of the courts in harmonizing new enactments
with preexisting law. David Shapiro has demonstrated that most
of the canons serve “the essentially conservative role of the courts
statutory gaps. Congress does not and cannot necessarily contemplate every future ap-
plication of a statute at the time of its drafting.”).
339 Federalist 37 (Madison), in The Federalist at 236 (cited in note 20).
340 See 131 S Ct at 1081.
341 Tyler, 99 Nw U L Rev at 1404 (cited in note 338).
342 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 294 (cited in note 303).
343 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 Harv L
Rev 1913, 1914 (1999); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, at 25–26 (un-
published manuscript on ﬁle with author) (explaining that new statutes are ordinarily
“defeasible” by background principles of law even if the text does not refer to those
principles).
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. . . in the more moderate sense of accommodating change to the
larger, essentially stable context in which it occurs.”344 One can
agree with Nelson that courts should not distort the meaning of
federal statutes in order to avoid preemption without accepting
that the Framers of the Supremacy Clause meant courts to aban-
don this basic function.
Most importantly, the “other tools of statutory interpretation”
have traditionally included a broad imperative to construe statutes
in light of constitutional values, including our constitutional com-
mitment to federalism. I have argued elsewhere that constitutional
principles are often implemented through statutes and other forms
of “ordinary” law.345 This is particularly true of federalism, which
has from the beginning been implemented not simply through
Article I’s division of powers but also through statutes allocating
the division of labor between, and law applied in, the state and
federal courts,346 structuring state political processes and regulat-
ing the behavior of state ofﬁcials,347 and—especially in the modern
era—delegating signiﬁcant responsibilities to state governments
within federal programs.348 When statutes implement constitu-
tional principles, statutory construction becomes a critical part of
the “reasoned elaboration” of constitutional values.349 As Henry
Hart and Al Sacks wrote over a half century ago,
344 Shapiro, 67 NYU L Rev at 925 (cited in note 52).
345 See generally Young, 117 Yale L J at 408 (cited in note 13).
346 See, for example, 28 USC §§ 1251, 1257 (giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over “all controversies between two or more States” and “All controversies between the
United States and a State,” as well as the power to review the decisions of the states’
highest courts); Anti-Injunction Act, 28 USC § 2283 (generally prohibiting federal courts
from enjoining state-court proceedings); Rules of Decision Act, 28 USC § 1652 (“The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).
347 See, for example, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, Title 1, § 5, 79 Stat
439 (1965), codiﬁed as amended at 42 USC § 1973c; 42 USC § 1983; Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103 (1972), codiﬁed as amended at
42 USC § 2000e(a) (extending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover state
governments).
348 See, for example, Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7401 et seq (regulating air emissions by,
in part, establishing “National Ambient Air Quality Standards” for every state and re-
quiring participating states to develop and enforce state implementation plans to reach
those standards); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124
Stat 119 (2010), to be codiﬁed in scattered sections of 26, 42 USC) (using federal and
state regulators to address health care reform). On the critical importance of such dele-
gations to federalism, see, for example, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, 118 Yale L J 1256
(cited in note 35).
349 See Young, 98 Cal L Rev at 1384–86 (cited in note 287).
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Not only does every particular legal arrangement have its own particular
purpose but that purpose is always a subordinate one in aid of the more
general and thus more nearly ultimate purposes of the law. Doubts
about the purposes of particular statutes or decisional doctrines, it
would seem to follow, must be resolved, if possible, so as to harmonize
them with more general principles and policies.350
Canons of statutory construction play a pivotal role in this effort.
The “rule of lenity” harmonizes criminal statutes with broader
principles of due process,351 for example, and the canon of con-
stitutional avoidance is best understood as a tool for protecting a
variety of constitutional principles.352
Normative canons can play this role even when the underlying
constitutional value might otherwise be extremely difﬁcult for
courts to enforce. Clear statement rules disfavoring restrictions
on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, for example, may be the
only viable way, in many instances, of protecting values of judicial
independence grounded in Article III.353 This is especially true of
federalism, which has been underenforced at least since 1937, and
many of the Court’s pro-federalism clear statement rules predate
the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival.”354 As I have already
discussed, the Rice presumption is an important aspect of this phe-
nomenon.
If Professor Nelson’s argument forbids reliance on Rice’s pre-
sumption against preemption, it is equally hostile to the Court’s
other pro-federalism clear statement rules. These include rules
disfavoring interpretations of federal statutes that would impose
conditions on states’ acceptance of federal funds,355 subject the
350 Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 148 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds) (Foundation,
1994).
351 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 332 (2000) (“The
rule of lenity is inspired by the due process constraint on conviction pursuant to open-
ended or vague statutes.”).
352 See Young, 78 Tex L Rev at 1585 (cited in note 337); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from
Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev 397 (2005).
353 See Young, 78 Tex L Rev at 1587 (cited in note 337).
354 See, for example, United States v Bass, 404 US 336 (1971); Murdoch v Memphis 87
US (20 Wall) 590 (1875) (refusing to ﬁnd that Congress intended to extend U.S. Supreme
Court review to questions of state law on appeal from the state courts absent a clear
statement of Congress’s intent to that effect).
355 Arlington Central School District Board of Education v Murphy, 548 US 291 (2006);
South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987).
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states to statutory liability under federal law,356 abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity,357 regulate the traditional functions of state
government,358 intrude on traditional concerns of state criminal
law,359 or regulate at the outer limits of Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority.360 Each of these rules potentially alters the con-
struction of federal statutes based on concern for state govern-
mental autonomy; each, therefore, would seem to run afoul of the
argument that the Supremacy Clause permits no presumption
against “implied repeals” of state prerogatives. The ubiquity of
these rules, however, and the decades of precedent behind many
of them, emphasizes the radical change that a broad reading of
Nelson’s argument would impose on the federal law of statutory
construction. One might thus apply the canon of avoidance to
Nelson’s argument itself, preferring a more modest reading that
would leave this pervasive and traditional judicial function intact.
3. Rice and the contemporary structure of federalism doctrine. The
Rice presumption rests not on the implied repeals canon but rather
on the evolving structure of our federalism. The presumption,
along with the Court’s other federalism-based “clear statement”
rules, developed long after the period examined by Professor Nel-
son. They developed for a reason: The Founders’ initial institu-
tional strategy for limiting national power and preserving state
autonomy had failed. That strategy relied on the speciﬁc enu-
meration of national powers in Article I of the Constitution and
the Tenth Amendment’s corresponding reservation of all other
powers to the states. As I described in Part I, this dual federalist
regime ultimately collapsed as a result of the Court’s difﬁculty in
drawing determinate boundaries to cabin terms like “commerce
among the several states” and “necessary and proper,” as well as
due to increasing pressure for national regulation in response to
industrialization and economic crisis. Notwithstanding the Rehn-
quist Court’s effort to retain some limits on the Commerce
356 Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989).
357 Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234 (1985); see also Chisholm v Georgia,
2 US (2 Dall) 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J, dissenting).
358 Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991).
359 United States v Bass, 404 US 336 (1971).
360 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United States Army Corps of Engineers,
531 US 159 (2001); United States v Jones, 529 US 848 (2000).
7] PREEMPTION AND THE ROBERTS COURT 321
Power,361 the principle of enumerated powers now offers relatively
little constraint on national action.362
The expanding scope of potential federal regulatory authority
in the mid-twentieth century transformed our federalism from a
regime of separate spheres to one of concurrent powers. With few
constitutional constraints on what Congress can do, the action
shifts to what Congress has done. To the extent that the Court
fashions doctrines to protect federalism in a concurrent regime,
then, those doctrines must take a different form. As Louise Wein-
berg has observed, “the very absence of formal impediments to
the erosion of dual federalism has elicited from the Supreme Court
a variety of prudential means of shoring up state power.”363 These
include judge-made abstention doctrines,364 narrowing construc-
tions of critical federal statutes,365 and a variety of state-protective
“clear statement” rules.366 As the cases just cited demonstrate, this
process of subconstitutional protection for federalism has been
going on for a very long time. The Rice presumption is less man-
datory than these other doctrines—it inﬂuences close cases of stat-
utory construction, rather than requiring a particular result in all
cases within its scope—but it is otherwise in the same vein.
Rice also responds to the parallel shift from relatively vigorous
361 See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate guns in schools); United States v Mor-
rison, 529 US 598 (2000) (holding that certain provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act exceeded federal power).
362 See, for example, Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1 (2005) (holding that the Commerce
Clause gives Congress authority to prohibit production and use of medical marijuana);
Young, Popular Constitutionalism (cited in note 127) (arguing that enumerated limits on
Congress’s powers are “underenforced”).
363 Weinberg, 70 Tex L Rev at 1749 (cited in note 325).
364 See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971) (requiring federal courts to
abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings); Railroad Commission v Pullman
Co., 312 US 496 (1941) (requiring federal courts to abstain in order to allow state courts
to decide unresolved questions of state law that might permit federal court to avoid a
federal constitutional question).
365 See, for example, Murdoch v City of Memphis, 87 US 590 (1875) (construing the
Judiciary Act to foreclose U.S. Supreme Court review of state court decisions on state
law issues); Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977) (construing the habeas statute to disallow
federal court review of federal claims not presented to the state courts unless the petitioner
can show cause and prejudice for the default).
366 See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991) (holding that Congress must
clearly state its intent to regulate the traditional functions of state government); Will v
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989) (Congress must speak clearly in order to
subject states to federal liability); United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971) (Congress
must speak clearly in order to intrude on state criminal jurisdiction).
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judicial enforcement of constitutional boundaries to a primary re-
liance on political and procedural checks on national authority.
Given that current federalism doctrine emphasizes the states’ rep-
resentation in Congress as the primary protection for federalism,
“a presumption against preemption promotes legislative deliber-
ation” about the implications of federal legislation for state au-
tonomy.367 Likewise, Rice’s presumption “may be used to imple-
ment constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures by
ensuring that Congress and the president—rather than judges—
make the crucial decision to override state law”; this is especially
important because those procedures are “cumbersome and exclu-
sive” by design.368 As Justice O’Connor wrote in Gregory, “‘to give
the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional
ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which
Garcia relied to protect states’ interests.’”369 The Rice presumption
is thus consistent with contemporary federalism doctrine’s em-
phasis on the political and procedural safeguards of federalism.
Professor Nelson asserts that “even though the political safe-
guards of federalism may affect Congress’s policy choices, they do
not compel any particular rules for construing the resulting stat-
utes”; moreover, “[f]or courts always to adopt narrowing construc-
tions of the language that Congress enacts would be to give the
political safeguards of federalism a kind of double weight.”370 But
even the Garcia Court did not say that the “political safeguards
of federalism” (not to mention the procedural ones, which Nelson
does not address) were never to be enforced by courts. The Court
simply said that “the fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States
as States’ is one of process rather than one of result,” and it sug-
gested that any judicial doctrine limiting national power “must
367 Verchick and Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism at 23 (cited in note
328).
368 Clark, Process-Based Preemption at 213 (cited in note 79).
369 Gregory, 501 US at 464, quoting Tribe, American Constitutional Law at § 6-25 (cited
in note 30); see also Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law at § 5-11 (cited in note 30)
(explaining that Gregory’s clear statement rule “ensures the efﬁcacy of the procedural
political safeguards that were Garcia’s focus”). To say this is not necessarily to demand
that Congress’s preemptive intent must be explicit in the statutory text, as a clear statement
rule would require. Rather, it is simply to ask that Congress’s intent be clear based on
the traditional sources by which courts generally determine that intent, including statutory
structure, legislative history, and the like.
370 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 299–300, 301 (cited in note 303) (emphasis in original).
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ﬁnd its justiﬁcation in the procedural nature of this basic limi-
tation.”371 Process-oriented judicial review, of course, can none-
theless be quite robust, as John Hart Ely’s “representation rein-
forcement” approach to individual rights has famously
demonstrated.372 I have argued elsewhere that Garcia in fact sup-
ports a “Democracy and Distrust” approach to federalism, where
the Court would emphasize process-oriented doctrines that would
ensure that the political and procedural safeguards of federalism
are respected and, where possible, enhance the operation of those
safeguards.373 Certainly the Rice presumption—which implements
and enhances political and procedural checks on federal power but
which imposes no substantive limits on congressional action—ﬁts
Garcia’s mandate that judicial review “must be tailored to com-
pensate for possible failings in the national political process rather
than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”374
Viewed in context, the non obstante aspect of the Supremacy
Clause responded to a particular institutional relationship between
state and federal law. In the early Republic, the new national gov-
ernment struggled to stake out a role in a political environment
dominated by preexisting state governments.375 In that circum-
stance, it made some sense to construe federal enactments broadly
and subordinate concerns about preempting too much of the pre-
existing state legal background. But the world is very different
now. As the current editors of the Hart & Wechsler casebook have
pointed out, in the twentieth century “the expansion of federal
legislation and administrative regulation . . . has accelerated. . . .
[A]t present federal law appears to be more primary than inter-
stitial in numerous areas.”376 And the norm in this denser regu-
latory environment is for state and federal legislation to coexist.377
Indeed, the contemporary danger to our federal balance comes
from the overexpansion of federal authority at the expense of state
autonomy.378
371 469 US at 554.
372 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 48).
373 See sources cited in note 47.
374 469 US at 554, quoting EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226, 236 (1983).
375 See generally Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1751–52, 1775–76 (cited in note
20).
376 Hart & Wechsler at 459 (cited in note 90).
377 See sources cited in note 328.
378 See Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1806–09 (cited in note 20).
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Under present circumstances, abandoning the Rice presumption
would undermine an already weak set of constitutional safeguards
for state autonomy. I have defended the presumption against pre-
emption elsewhere as a necessary “compensating adjustment” to
preserve the Constitution’s commitment to federalism in an era
when the courts no longer enforce strong substantive limits on
Congress’s enumerated powers and rely instead on political and
procedural checks on federal legislative action.379 To the extent
that the Framers did intend a strong non obstante reading of the
Supremacy Clause, they assumed it would operate in an institu-
tional context deﬁned by strong enumerated powers constraints
on federal action, separation-of-powers constraints sharply limit-
ing the production of federal law, and vigorous judicial enforce-
ment of all those constraints. These assumptions no longer hold.380
It makes little sense to apply a contemporary sense of the scope
of Congress’s regulatory authority and the role of judicial review
in constitutional federalism cases but insist on a circa-1789 set of
preemption rules.
One need not go so far, however, because courts can give effect
to the Framers’ original understanding of the Supremacy Clause
as a non obstante provision without rejecting Rice. As I have already
discussed, Professor Nelson’s reading of the Clause may foreclose
only weighing state interests against federal ones in preemption
cases, “harmonizing” federal law with state law in ways that subvert
the clear intent of Congress, or converting Rice into a strong clear
statement rule that would disallow recourse to the traditional tools
of statutory construction. The Supreme Court has applied Rice,
however, as a “plus factor” for resolving close cases under ambig-
uous statutes. As the cases in the 2010 Term demonstrate, the
problem with Rice’s presumption against preemption is not that
it is inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, but rather that it is
too frequently ignored.
379 See id at 1848–50. On compensating adjustments, see generally id at 1748–62; Adrian
Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U Chi L Rev 421, 426 (2003). This
approach is controversial. See, for example, John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality
Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv L Rev 2003 (2009); Michael J. Klarman,
Antiﬁdelity, 70 S Cal L Rev 381 (1997). That debate, which I have addressed in the earlier
work cited above, is beyond the scope of the present essay.
380 See, for example, Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
Harv L Rev 1231 (1994).
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b. non obstante, part 2—implied preemption
Professor Nelson’s originalist reading of the Supremacy Clause
has quite different implications for cases of implied preemption.
Nelson argues that the Framers’ understanding of the Supremacy
Clause, within the context of a broader doctrine of repeals, com-
pels a particular test for conﬂict preemption: state law is preempted
only if there is a “logical contradiction” between state and federal
law.381 Under this approach, implied conﬂict preemption would
generally be much narrower than the doctrine applied in many
recent cases. Justice Thomas, for whom Nelson clerked in the
1994 Term, has adopted this argument in a series of separate opin-
ions, and this body of opinions represents the most sustained effort
by any Justice to develop a full-blown theory of preemption. Last
Term, in PLIVA, he persuaded three other Justices—Roberts,
Scalia, and Alito—to join that theory.382 This section considers
Professor Nelson’s arguments about implied preemption, their
contribution to Justice Thomas’s emerging theory, and the im-
plications of these arguments for future doctrine.
According to Professor Nelson, “the Supremacy Clause puts the
doctrine of preemption within the same general framework as the
traditional doctrine of repeals,” which held that a later law su-
perseded an earlier one only where the two provisions were “re-
pugnant” to one another.383 The Supremacy Clause established a
rule of federal priority rather than a temporal one, but “the Su-
premacy Clause’s rule of priority matters only when state law is
‘repugnant to’ valid federal law; the rule of priority comes into
play only when courts cannot apply both state law and federal law,
but instead must choose between them.”384 Under this “logical-
contradiction test,” broad notions of obstacle preemption are un-
constitutional.385 Nelson concludes that, under this view, “courts
could no longer ﬁnd preemption simply because they think that
381 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 260 (cited in note 303).
382 131 S Ct at 2579–80 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, who provided the ﬁfth
vote for the remainder of Thomas’s PLIVA opinion, did not join the non obstante section.
383 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 236, 245–46 (cited in note 303), quoting William Blackstone,
1 Commentaries 59 (1765).
384 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 251 (cited in note 303).
385 Id at 260, 265–90.
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state law hinders accomplishment of the ‘full purposes and ob-
jectives’ behind a federal statute.”386
Justice Thomas adopted some of this reasoning three Terms
ago, in his separate concurrence in Wyeth. There, Thomas an-
nounced that “I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s
‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence,” which “rou-
tinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conﬂicts with broad
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions
of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text
of federal law.”387 These “implied pre-emption doctrines that wan-
der far from the statutory text,” he concluded, “are inconsistent
with the Constitution.”388 Thomas’s argument in Wyeth rested
primarily on two grounds: First, he read the Supremacy Clause
to require “that pre-emptive effect be given only to those federal
standards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow
from, the statutory text that was produced through the consti-
tutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures.”389
This “structural limitation” preludes implied preemption “based
on [the Court’s] interpretation of broad federal policy objectives,
legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional pur-
poses that are not contained within the text of federal law.”390
Second, Thomas emphasized the incompatibility of obstacle pre-
emption with judicial restraint. “[T]his brand of the Court’s pre-
emption jurisprudence,” he said, “facilitates freewheeling, extra-
textual, and broad evaluations of the ‘purposes and objectives’
embodied within federal law,” leading to “decisions giving im-
properly broad pre-emptive effect to judicially manufactured pol-
icies, rather than to the statutory text enacted by Congress.”391
Wyeth cited Professor Nelson’s work and suggested that Nelson’s
“logical contradiction” test might provide a superior approach to
conﬂict preemption questions.392
Justice Thomas’s opinion last Term in PLIVA went further, ex-
plicitly adopting Professor Nelson’s reading that “[t]he phrase ‘any
386 Id at 304.
387 555 US at 583 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
388 Id.
389 Id at 586.
390 Id at 586, 587.
391 555 US at 604.
392 Id at 590.
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[state law] to the Contrary notwithstanding’ [in the Supremacy
Clause] is a non obstante provision.”393 This aspect of the Clause
“therefore suggests that federal law should be understood to im-
pliedly repeal conﬂicting state law”; moreover, it also “suggests
that courts should not strain to ﬁnd ways to reconcile federal law
with seemingly conﬂicting state law.”394 Justice Kennedy declined
to join this section of the opinion, and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
criticized the plurality for “adopt[ing] the novel theory that the
Framers intended for the Supremacy Clause to operate as a so-
called non obstante provision.”395 According to Sotomayor, “[t]he
plurality’s new theory of the Supremacy Clause is a direct assault”
on Rice and many other precedents “presum[ing] that federal law
does not pre-empt, or repeal, state law.”396
It is easy to see the reasons for Justice Sotomayor’s concern. As
she noted, “whereas [the Court has] long required evidence of a
‘clear and manifest’ purpose to pre-empt, the plurality now in-
structs courts to ‘look no further than the ordinary meaning of
federal law’ before concluding that Congress must have intended
to cast aside state law.”397 The implications of Justice Thomas’s
approach are complex, however. As Sotomayor acknowledged,
“[t]he plurality . . . carefully avoid[ed] discussing the ramiﬁcations
of its new theory for the longstanding presumption against pre-
emption”;398 instead, Justice Thomas invoked the non obstante ar-
gument as part of the Court’s most sophisticated discussion to
date of impossibility preemption. The upshot of PLIVA was to make
impossibility preemption somewhat easier to establish. The Court
held that manufacturers of generic drugs had made out a case of
impossibility preemption because the manufacturers could not
comply with state-law labeling requirements without seeking prior
federal approval—even though that approval might well have been
forthcoming if they had sought it.399
It is critical to remember, however, that for PLIVA’s author,
393 131 S Ct at 2579 (plurality opinion), citing Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 238–40 (cited
in note 303).
394 131 S Ct at 2580.
395 Id at 2590 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
396 Id at 2591.
397 Id (citation omitted).
398 Id at 2591 n 14.
399 See Part II.B (discussing PLIVA, 131 S Ct 2567 (2010)).
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impossibility is the only kind of conﬂict preemption; in Wyeth,
after all, Thomas rejected “obstacle” preemption as unconstitu-
tional. Taking the two positions together—a loosening of impos-
sibility preemption in PLIVA, and a rejection of obstacle preemp-
tion in Wyeth—the result is surely a net gain for preemption
opponents. PLIVA’s signiﬁcance is limited to contexts in which
the source of impossibility is a need for government approval to
take an action required by state law, and it is also cabined by Wyeth
itself, which held that a regulated entity can not establish impos-
sibility simply by showing that a step required by state law would
ultimately be subject to a federal regulatory veto.400 On the other
hand, there are hordes of obstacle preemption claims out there,
and eliminating this whole category of preemption would signif-
icantly limit the preemptive impact of federal law.
There is, of course, one rather large ﬂy in this ointment. Justice
Thomas’s expansion of impossibility preemption was for a majority
of the Court (even if he did not get ﬁve for the non obstante aspect
of his argument), while his rejection of obstacle preemption re-
mains a dissenting position. Worse, he has not thus far been able
to persuade any other Justices to join him in rejecting “purposes
and objectives” preemption. If the Court lowers the bar to im-
possibility preemption while maintaining a broad view of obstacle
preemption, that would hardly be good for state autonomy.
Last Term’s cases did, however, provide some evidence that the
Court is raising the overall bar for conﬂict preemption. The Court
rejected a strong obstacle preemption argument in Whiting, and
while the majority did not invoke Rice per se, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s opinion did insist that “[o]ur precedents ‘establish that a
high threshold must be met if a state law is to be pre-empted for
conﬂicting with the purposes of a federal Act.’”401 The Chief ech-
oed Justice Thomas’s call for judicial restraint in Wyeth when he
said that “[i]mplied preemption analysis does not justify a ‘free-
wheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension
400 See Part II.C. But see James M. Beck, Top Ten Best Prescription Drug/Medical DeviceDecisions
of 2011, Drug and Device Law (Dec 30, 2011), online at http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot
.com/2011/12/top-ten-best-prescription-drugmedical.html (predicting that PLIVA’s holding
is “usable elsewhere . . . [considering] how that test might play in the context of, say, black
box warnings, design defect claims (both drugs and non-PMA devices), Dear Doctor letters,
and any other situation where our clients are required to get the FDA’s (or some other
federal agency’s) sign off before doing this or that”).
401 131 S Ct at 1985, quoting Gade, 505 US at 110 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and
in the judgment).
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with federal objectives’; such an endeavor ‘would undercut the
principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts
state law.’”402
Perhaps equally signiﬁcant, a unanimous Court in Williamson
made a critical point about the preemptive effects of federal cost/
beneﬁt analyses. Although the federal agency had determined that
requiring lap-and-shoulder belts in rear interior seats would not
be cost effective, the Court rejected the notion that a contrary
judgment under state law would pose an obstacle to federal policy.
Justice Breyer explained:
[M]any, perhaps most, federal safety regulations embody some kind of
cost-effectiveness judgment. . . . [T]o infer from the mere existence of
such a cost-effectiveness judgment that the federal agency intends to
bar States from imposing stricter standards would treat all such federal
standards as if they were maximum standards, eliminating the possibility
that the federal agency seeks only to set forth a minimum standard
potentially supplemented through state tort law. We cannot reconcile
this consequence with a statutory saving clause that foresees the like-
lihood of a continued meaningful role for state tort law.403
Given Geier’s holding that the mere existence of such a savings
clause does not foreclose obstacle preemption arguments,404 Wil-
liamson’s statement seems generalizable to most obstacle preemp-
tion contexts: A federal agency’s decision not to impose a regu-
latory requirement based on a cost/beneﬁt calculus will not,
without more, necessarily preempt a state-law judgment that such
a requirement is cost effective. Many preemption arguments take
just this form, and Williamson should make that sort of argument
much harder to win.
Finally, even Bruesewitz may contain some good news for op-
ponents of obstacle preemption. Bruesewitz was an express pre-
emption case, and it ruled in favor of preemption. But the opinions
featured a key methodological disagreement between Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion, with its somewhat remarkable unwill-
ingness to consider arguments outside the text of the statute, and
the concurrence and dissent, respectively, of Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor. Although they disagreed as to outcome, both Breyer
402 131 S Ct at 1985, quoting Gade, 505 US at 111 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and
in the judgment).
403 131 S Ct at 1139.
404 See 529 US at 869 (“We now conclude that the saving clause . . . does not bar the
ordinary working of conﬂict pre-emption principles.”).
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and Sotomayor were willing to consider a much broader universe
of agency positions and policy arguments to resolve what otherwise
seemed a close case on the text alone.405 Obstacle preemption
arguments, of course, tend to rely heavily on precisely these sorts
of arguments, and the determination of a majority of the Court
to stick close to the text—if it holds in other contexts—may well
cut against obstacle preemption more often than not. However,
Bruesewitz also highlights one of the obstacles, if you will, to adop-
tion of Thomas’s position by a majority of the Court. At least
some of the Court’s liberal wing, who generally tend to vote
against preemption, are methodologically attached either to policy
arguments generally (Sotomayor) or to both policy arguments and
agency views (Breyer).406 Breyer, after all, was the author of Geier,
which found obstacle preemption in the teeth of an express savings
clause for state common law claims.407 Those methodological com-
mitments will make it difﬁcult for the liberals to abandon obstacle
preemption altogether, although they may take a narrower view
of it than some of their more conservative colleagues.
It thus seems possible that Justice Thomas will inﬂuence some
of his conservative colleagues to take a narrower view of obstacle
preemption, but consensus on that point seems likely to remain
elusive. The other obvious question concerns the implications of
these arguments about implied preemption for the Rice presump-
tion. After all, Professor Nelson framed his attack on broad notions
of implied preemption and his critique of the Rice presumption as
two sides of the same coin. One observer has noted that “Mensing
. . . reveals a Court that is about as evenly split as it is possible
to be on the presumption against preemption, with four Justices
saying no, four saying yes, and Justice Kennedy (who else on this
Court?) supporting preemption without feeling the need to ad-
dress that issue.”408 And Justice Stevens—the author of both Altria
and Wyeth and the Court’s most consistently anti-preemption Jus-
405 See notes 221–26 and accompanying text.
406 See generally Stephen G. Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Consti-
tution (Vintage, 2005).
407 529 US at 869–74. Justice Thomas wrote separately in Williamson primarily to express
his continuing dissent from that approach. See 131 S Ct at 1141–42 (Thomas, J, concurring
in the judgment).
408 Beck, Top Ten Best Decisions (cited in note 400).
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tice during his long tenure409—is no longer on the Court.
The Court’s failure to invoke Rice as part of a majority holding
in any of the ﬁve cases last Term may provide some evidence that
the presumption against preemption is in trouble, notwithstanding
the reasons already given not to take that failure too seriously.
And Justice Thomas (joined by the Chief and Justices Scalia and
Alito) signaled his opposition to applying Rice to express preemp-
tion in his Altria dissent three years ago.410 It is not clear, however,
that Thomas’s emerging position ought to foreclose a presumption
against preemption. First, the Nelson/Thomas position on conﬂict
preemption, functionally speaking, is a form of Rice. By ruling out
obstacle preemption and requiring a “direct” conﬂict or “logical
contradiction” between federal and state law, Thomas would raise
the bar—quite substantially—for conﬂict preemption. That result
would strengthen Rice’s presumption against preemption in con-
ﬂict cases.
Nor is it clear that Justice Thomas’s rejection of Rice for express
preemption in his Altria dissent follows from the other positions
he has taken. In particular, Thomas’s separate opinion in Wyeth
emphasized the procedural safeguards of federalism: obstacle pre-
emption based on extratextual evidence of Congress’s broad pur-
pose, he argued, contravened the Supremacy Clause’s command
that only textual mandates that have run Article I’s legislative
gauntlet can supersede state law.411 The Rice presumption in ex-
press cases rests on similar arguments. I have argued that the
presumption against preemption is designed to ensure that Con-
gress deliberates about preemption and that preemption does not
occur unless its proponents have surmounted the procedural ob-
stacles to federal lawmaking.412 And as Brad Clark has suggested,
inferring preemption from ambiguous language “risk[s] circum-
venting the political and procedural safeguards of federalism built
into the Supremacy Clause.”413 There is no obvious reason, in
other words, why Justice Thomas’s reasoning in Wyeth should not
have applied in Altria as well.
409 See Young, 46 Vill L Rev at 1380–95 (cited in note 39) (discussing Justice Stevens’s
leadership on preemption issues).
410 See text accompanying notes 108–10.
411 See 555 US at 586–88 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
412 See notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
413 Clark, Process-Based Preemption at 209 (cited in note 79).
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Finally, Professor Nelson has acknowledged that it makes no
sense to reject Rice in express preemption cases unless one also
adopts his position barring obstacle preemption:
To be sure, [the Rice] presumption makes some sense within the Frame-
work that the Supreme Court has developed for preemption cases. . . .
By telling judges to approach federal statutes with “the starting pre-
sumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,” the
Supreme Court offsets its own expansive formulations of “implied”
preemption. The presumption thus operates as an artiﬁcial way to bring
the courts’ results closer to Congress’s probable “pre-emptive intent.”414
To be sure, Nelson views Rice as “a second-best alternative to a
broader overhaul of the Court’s doctrine.”415 But until Justice
Thomas succeeds in persuading his colleagues to undertake a
“broader overhaul” of conﬂict preemption,416 he and others sym-
pathetic to Nelson’s argument should hesitate to reconsider Rice.
Nelson’s historical research provides no support for doing the
latter without the former.
c. traditional spheres and the vestiges of dual federalism
The other salient question concerning Rice’s presumption
against preemption concerns its subject-matter scope. Although
the presumption is sometimes framed as a general one,417 courts
frequently purport to limit it to ﬁelds of traditional state authority.
The latter approach, however, reintroduces the same confusion
that led to the demise of dual federalism in the ﬁrst place.
The most prominent recent example of the bounded approach
to Rice is the Court’s 2000 decision in United States v Locke.418 That
decision held that federal laws regulating the safety of oil tankers
preempted measures enacted by the state of Washington, in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, imposing more rigorous pre-
414 Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 290–91 (cited in note 303).
415 Id at 291.
416 For a skeptical view, see Michael C. Dorf, The Most Confusing Branch, 45 Tulsa L
Rev 191, 193 (2009) (suggesting that “given Justice Thomas’s willingness to express id-
iosyncratic views on a range of issues—including federalism—one cannot be very optimistic
about the prospect of his inspiring a wholesale doctrinal reformulation in this area”).
417 See, for example, Building & Construction Trades Council v Associated Builders & Con-
tractors, 507 US 218, 224 (1993) (“We are reluctant to infer pre-emption.”); Maryland v
Louisiana, 451 US 725, 746 (1981) (“Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts
with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.”).
418 529 US 89 (2000).
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cautions on tankers operating in state waters. Prior precedent on
this question had applied Rice’s presumption against preemption,419
but the Court rejected that approach in Locke. Emphasizing Rice’s
observation that “Congress legislated here in a ﬁeld which the
States have traditionally occupied,”420 Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court in Locke reasoned that “an ‘assumption’ of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where
there has been a history of signiﬁcant federal presence.”421 Ob-
serving that “[t]he state laws now in question bear upon national
and international maritime commerce”—a ﬁeld in which “Con-
gress has legislated . . . from the earliest days of the Republic”—
Kennedy concluded that “in this area there is no beginning as-
sumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise
of its police powers.”422
This rejection of Rice’s interpretive presumption mattered in
Locke. Not only did the Court not resolve doubts about the federal
regulatory measures at issue against preemption, it also narrowly
construed express savings clauses in the federal Oil Pollution Act
that preserved state authority to regulate risks relating to oil
spills.423 “Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined,” Jus-
tice Kennedy said, “respects the established federal-state balance
in matters of maritime commerce between the subjects as to which
the States retain concurrent powers and those over which the
federal authority displaces state control.”424 More fundamentally,
the statutory construction issues in Locke were quite close, as il-
lustrated both by the Court’s contrary conclusions about the in-
teraction of similar statutory schemes in Ray twelve years earlier425
and the Locke Court’s decision to remand several of the preemption
issues to the lower courts for further consideration.426
Although the Court was unanimous in Locke, subsequent de-
cisions have not consistently adhered to its restriction of Rice to
419 See Ray v Atlantic Richﬁeld Co., 435 US 151, 157 (1978), quoting Rice, 331 US at
230.
420 331 US at 230.
421 529 US at 108.
422 Id.
423 33 USC §§ 2718(a), (c).
424 529 US at 106.
425 Ray, 435 US at 157.
426 529 US at 116–17.
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certain subject-matter spheres. Just as Locke ignored the Court’s
statement four years earlier that Rice applies “[i]n all cases,”427
subsequent cases have occasionally ignored Locke and reafﬁrmed
Rice’s general applicability.428 This sort of ﬂip-ﬂopping may illus-
trate a broader phenomenon. The Justices evidently consider
themselves bound to prior results and speciﬁc statutory interpre-
tations arrived at in preemption opinions they have joined, but
they often seem to treat discussions of interpretive methodology
in those prior cases as something like dictum. A Justice may not
feel the need to refuse to join, much less dissent from, a statement
applying or refusing to apply an interpretive presumption, so long
as she thinks the ultimate interpretation of the statute is correct.
This phenomenon may simply reﬂect the necessities of peaceful
coexistence on a multimember court,429 and as such it is not nec-
essarily a bad thing. On the other hand, it is not exactly conducive
to clarity in the Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
There is another ambiguity in the Court’s approach in Locke
and similar decisions. In Rice, the presumption against preemption
was triggered by a history of state regulation in the relevant ﬁeld—
as Justice Douglas put it, the fact that “Congress legislated here
in a ﬁeld which the States have traditionally occupied.”430 Most
of the other cases that tie Rice to speciﬁc regulatory ﬁelds use
similar language.431 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Locke, however,
switched the relevant actors, inquiring whether “the State regulates
in an area where there has been a history of signiﬁcant federal
presence.”432 This bit of slippage matters, because the truth is that
most regulatory ﬁelds have a history of concurrent federal and
state presence. That is especially true from the New Deal onward,
but there are many signiﬁcant examples dating to the dawn of the
427 Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485 (1996).
428 See, for example, Wyeth, 555 US at 565.
429 See note 298 and accompanying text (suggesting that such practices are a form of
“incompletely theorized agreement”).
430 331 US at 230.
431 See, for example, Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 US 519, 525 (1977) (applying Rice
“[w]here, as here, the ﬁeld which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally
occupied by the States”); Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471
US 707, 715 (1985) (same); Medtronic, 518 US at 485 (stating that Rice applies “[i]n all
pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a
ﬁeld which the States have traditionally occupied,’” quoting Rice). This remains true after
Locke. See, for example, Wyeth, 555 US at 565, quoting the language from Medtronic above.
432 529 US at 108 (emphasis added).
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Republic. Consider, for example, the ﬁeld at issue in Locke—mar-
itime commerce and safety. Federal law and (more importantly)
federal courts have long had a signiﬁcant role in maritime matters,
but the First Judiciary Act’s “Savings to Suitors” Clause guaranteed
state courts and state law a role in maritime disputes,433 and Chief
Justice Marshall acknowledged in Gibbons v Ogden434 that state
governments have legitimate police power grounds to regulate
commerce on navigable waters.435 In other words, Justice Kennedy
is plainly correct to say that maritime commerce has “a history of
signiﬁcant federal presence,” but he would also be correct to say
maritime commerce has a history of signiﬁcant state presence. The
answer to Rice’s applicability, in other words, will frequently de-
pend on which way one asks the question.
The more fundamental problem, however, is the indeterminacy
of any approach that tries to divide up the world into spheres of
state and federal primacy.436 One might avoid the Locke problem
simply by asking whether state or federal law predominates in a
given area—a question that Locke arguably got right with respect
to maritime commerce.437 But in most areas where preemption
litigation arises, this predominance problem will be considerably
less clear. Consider last Term’s drug safety decisions in Bruesewitz
and PLIVA, or the auto safety decision in Williamson. Each area
is marked by a mix of state and federal regulation. Federal law
tends to set standards for and approve products on the front end,
before they are marketed to consumers; state products liability
law, on the other hand, provides incentives to identify and correct
unforeseen dangers in approved products and compensates victims
when products do harm. Both forms of regulation have been
433 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, 9(a), 1 Stat 77. The current version is 28 USC § 1333.
434 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 21–22 (1824). See also Cooley v Board of Wardens of Port of
Philadelphia, 53 US (12 How) 299 (1852) (upholding state regulation of maritime commerce
where it was necessarily adapted to local conditions).
435 See generally David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism: History and Analysis of
Problems of Federal-State Relations in the Maritime Law of the United States (Foundation,
1970) (surveying the complicated interplay of federal and state law in maritime matters);
Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 273 (1999) (sailing in Professor
Robertson’s wake).
436 See Garcia, 469 US at 546 (rejecting “as unsound in principle and workable in
practice, a rule of state immunity . . . that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a
particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional’”).
437 Some difﬁcult people might quibble even here, arguing that for most of our history,
maritime law was considered neither state nor federal in character. See Young, 67 Geo
Wash L Rev at 293 (cited in note 435).
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around for a relatively long time, and both are plainly important.
But it is hard to know how one would go about determining which
level of regulation “predominates.” Would one measure the num-
ber of government ofﬁcials at each level involved in regulation?
Assess the relative costs imposed by each? Count the number of
government enforcement actions? The more speciﬁc one gets
about methods of measurement, the more nonsensical the enter-
prise seems. But as things stand, it is hard not to conclude that
courts are simply making off-the-cuff intuitive judgments.
A related difﬁculty compounds the problem: In most cases, the
relevant “ﬁeld” can be characterized in multiple ways.438 Fields
can, for instance, be characterized at different levels of generality.
Was Bruesewitz a case about vaccines—a matter on which federal
law has taken the lead? Was it a case about medical safety—which
features divided responsibility between federal premarket approval
of drugs and devices and state postmarket regulation through the
tort system? Or was it, even more broadly, simply a products
liability case—a ﬁeld of traditional state regulation? There is also
a problem of overlap. Concepcion, for instance, was an arbitration
case, and federal law has traditionally dominated that ﬁeld. But it
was also an important case about consumer protection, a tradi-
tional state ﬁeld. Similarly, Whiting could easily be characterized
as an immigration case, and therefore a state intrusion into a ﬁeld
that many view as exclusively federal. But Chief Justice Roberts
dismissed this argument by pointing out that “[r]egulating in-state
businesses through licensing laws has never been considered such
an area of dominant federal concern.”439
These characterization games are great fun for law professors
but not necessarily good for the law. They are reminiscent of the
difﬁculties that plagued and ultimately hastened the end of the
Court’s “dual federalism” regime—in particular, the Court’s in-
ability to draw determinate lines.440 To be sure, the stakes are lower
in the current context, because the Court is not assessing whether
Congress or a state government has the power to legislate at all,
but rather which interpretive rules to apply in construing Con-
438 See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional law, 111 Yale L J 1311
(2002) (noting the indeterminacy problems that arise from different ways of framing the
same transaction).
439 131 S Ct at 1983.
440 See Part I.A.
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gress’s intent. Nonetheless, as Trevor Morrison has pointed out,
the “problem with both the presumption against preemption and
federalism-enforcing clear statement rules, at least as they are cur-
rently formulated,” is that “[t]hey are all structured around sub-
stantive triggers that require courts to identify and attach great
consequence to the ‘historic’ functions of the states.”441 Similarly,
Robert Schapiro has noted that “current federal preemption doc-
trine at times manifests a . . . dualist spirit.”442
To some extent, some differentiation of preemption doctrine by
subject matter may be inevitable. Congress’s purpose remains the
“ultimate touchstone” in preemption cases,443 and that intent varies
by regulatory ﬁeld. Over time, the Court develops an interpretive
tradition, if you will, in particular regulatory areas. In the banking
ﬁeld, for instance, the Court’s “history is one of interpreting grants
of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as
grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily
pre-empting, contrary state law.”444 This history does not mean
that preemption claims always win in banking cases,445 but it does
mean that the Court employs a somewhat different set of inter-
pretive assumptions in that area. Problems may arise when reg-
ulatory schemes intersect; Barnett Bank, for example, could have
been characterized as an insurance case—and therefore part of a
regulatory tradition considerably more favorable to state law—
rather than a banking case.446 But while such cases may raise dif-
ﬁcult questions of statutory construction, they are hardly intrac-
table and stem directly from the Court’s obligation to determine
Congress’s will.
It may also be possible to characterize the contexts in which
441 Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in Buzbee, ed, Pre-
emption Choice at 81, 91 (cited in note 8). See also Pursley, 71 Ohio St L J at 515 n 5
(cited in note 9) (noting that even if one reads recent decisions as clarifying that Rice
applies in all cases, “the Court has retained the most confusing element of the doctrine—
the need to identify areas of ‘traditional’ state authority—by suggesting gradations in the
‘force’ of the presumption based on whether the potentially preempted state law occupies
such an area,” citing Altria, 555 US at 77).
442 Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony at 48 (cited in note 8).
443 Medtronic, 518 US at 486.
444 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v Nelson, 517 US 25, 32 (1996).
445 See Cuomo v Clearing House Association, LLC, 129 S Ct 2710 (2009) (holding that
federal banking laws did not preempt the states’ authority to enforce state banking laws
against national banks).
446 See 517 US at 37–41.
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the Court views preemption more favorably in a nonarbitrary way.
Rick Hills has suggested that the Court ﬁnds preemption more
readily in “commercial” cases involving laws “deﬁning the rules
for bargaining and remedies for breach of bargains,” than in “reg-
ulatory” cases “involv[ing] state and federal laws deﬁning the base-
line entitlements over which the parties bargain.”447 For Professor
Hills, this explains the Court’s willingness to construe the Federal
Arbitration Act broadly in Concepcion, while approaching preemp-
tion more cautiously in an auto-safety case like Williamson. The
availability of arbitration, after all, is part of the remedies for
breach of bargains, while products liability cases like Williamson
involve substantive safety requirements.448
However useful Professor Hills’s distinction between commer-
cial and regulatory cases is as a descriptive matter, I doubt that it
provides a useful principle to guide the Court in deciding hard
cases going forward.449 One problem is that the distinction is
hardly crisp. As Hills acknowledges,450 questions of remedy are
not unrelated to regulatory matters—the availability of class ac-
tions, for instance, signiﬁcantly increases the deterrent effect of
state consumer protection rules.451 And it is possible to frame the
issues in some of the “regulatory” drug cases as “commercial”
questions about the forum for and nature of available remedies.
Bruesewitz, for example, concerned whether persons injured by
federally approved vaccines could seek compensation through the
state tort system or must rely on a federal procedure through the
Court of Claims.452 Moreover, converting the commercial/regu-
latory distinction into a normative principle would require some
argument for grounding it in the Constitution, rather than in a
policy argument about what state and national decision makers do
447 Roderick M. Hills Jr., Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional Dual
Federalism by Another Name? (unpublished manuscript at 1) (Oct 12, 2011) (on ﬁle with
author). Professor Hills explains that “[t]he ‘mailbox rule’ deﬁning when a contract is
accepted is an example of a ‘commercial’ law, while a prohibition on ﬁlling a wetlands or
building a cement plant in a residential zone are examples of ‘regulatory’ laws.” Id.
448 See Id. To be sure, Bruesewitz and PLIVA—also “regulatory” cases—nonetheless
found preemption. But it does seem fair to say that the Court’s overall record in arbitration
cases is more strongly preemptive than in its drug and medical device safety cases.
449 Professor Hills makes clear that his argument is meant to be primarily descriptive.
See Hills, Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court (cited in note 447).
450 Id.
451 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1752.
452 See Part II.C.
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best.453 For that reason, it compares unfavorably with process fed-
eralism rules like the presumption against preemption, which can
be grounded in the political and procedural checks built into the
constitutional structure of federal lawmaking.454
Controversy over the scope of Rice seems likely to increase in
the 2011 Term, when the Court will hear Arizona v United States.455
That case is the Justice Department’s challenge to Arizona’s SB
1070, which provides for broad state enforcement of federal im-
migration laws and extends beyond the employment context con-
sidered in Whiting. As Rick Hills has noted, “[t]he surprising aspect
of Whiting . . . is that the Roberts Court’s analysis of preemption
was so conventional”; the Court “brushed aside the idea that Ar-
izona encroached on a forbidden federal ﬁeld of foreign relations
law.”456 That argument will return with a vengeance in Arizona,
as it formed a critical theme in the Ninth Circuit’s decision striking
down SB 1070. Judge Paez’s opinion for the court of appeals held
that “[t]he states have not traditionally occupied the ﬁeld of iden-
tifying immigration violations so we apply no presumption against
preemption.”457 As the Court did in Locke, the Ninth Circuit read
a savings clause in the federal immigration statutes narrowly, and
it gave effect not only to the preemptive choices of Congress but
also to the enforcement discretion of the national Executive.458
Finally, the Court of Appeals gave independent preemptive force
to its judgment that the Arizona law intruded on the national
government’s power over foreign relations,459 a theme that Judge
Noonan posted in neon lights in his separate concurrence.460
453 See Hills, Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court (cited in note 447) (approving the
distinction primarily on policy grounds).
454 See text accompanying notes 44–54.
455 132 S Ct 845 (2011).
456 Hills, Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court (cited in note 447).
457 United States v Arizona, 641 F3d 349, 348 (9th Cir 2011).
458 See id at 349, 351–52.
459 Id at 352–53 & n 12 (observing that “[t]he Court’s decision in [Hines v Davidowitz,
312 US 52 (1941)] demonstrates that the Court has long been wary of state statutes which
may interfere with foreign relations”).
460 See Arizona, 641 F3d at 368 (Noonan concurring) (“The foreign policy of the United
States preempts the ﬁeld entered by Arizona. Foreign policy is not and cannot be deter-
mined by the several states. Foreign policy is determined by the nation as the nation
interacts with other nations. Whatever in any substantial degree attempts to express a
policy by a single state or by several states toward other nations enters an exclusively
federal ﬁeld.”).
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I have argued elsewhere that foreign relations law is the last
bastion of the dual federalism that the Court generally abandoned
in 1937.461 At the height of the Cold War, the Court purported
to set foreign relations aside as an exclusively federal sphere, so
that state action touching that ﬁeld would be preempted even in
the absence of action by Congress.462 That doctrine largely with-
ered on the vine, however, because a virtually inﬁnite variety of
actions by state governments in fact affect foreign relations. The
Court has repeatedly refused to interfere with the power of state
governments to execute foreign nationals for murders committed
within the state, notwithstanding vociferous protests by the rel-
evant foreign governments and, in some cases, attempts by the
national executive to intervene.463 The truth is that, in our con-
stitutional system of both horizontal and vertical separation of
powers, it is virtually impossible for the United States actually to
speak “with one voice”—in foreign relations or otherwise.464
Arizona v United States thus provides the Court with an op-
portunity to state more explicitly what it implicitly established in
Whiting: That dual federalism is dead, and that concurrent reg-
ulation is the norm even in ﬁelds like immigration that impact
foreign relations. After all, if foreign affairs cannot be cordoned
off as a separate sphere of federal primacy, then it is hard to think
of any other ﬁelds that can be. Adopting one set of interpretive
rules that applies to all preemption cases regardless of the un-
derlying substance of the case would go a long way toward ratio-
nalizing the Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
IV. The Politics of Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts
Court
One observer recently asserted that “Chief Justice John
461 Young, 69 Geo Wash L Rev at 177–80 (cited in note 28).
462 Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429 (1968).
463 See, for example, Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491 (2008) (holding that neither the
President nor the International Court of Justice had the power to prevent Texas from
executing a Mexican national, notwithstanding Texas’s alleged violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations); Breard v Greene, 523 US 371 (1998) (rejecting suit
by Paraguay seeking to stop Virginia’s execution of a Paraguayan national, allegedly in
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).
464 See, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 46 Vill L Rev 975 (2001) (arguing that neither the Constitution nor U.S. history
supports the claim that the President speaks for the nation with one voice).
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Roberts has an opportunity to add his name to the . . . exclusive
list of those—like John Marshall, Roger Taney and Earl Warren—
whose leadership of the Court has marked a shift in Court history
and a new era of constitutional doctrine.”465 All three of the po-
tential blockbuster cases cited in support of this prediction—the
Arizona immigration case, the Texas redistricting case, and the
challenge to the national healthcare law—raise signiﬁcant issues
of federalism.466 And while only one of them—the Arizona case—
is explicitly framed as a preemption issue, the other two have
signiﬁcant preemption implications.467 It is too early, in my view,
to say that this Court will usher in “a new era of constitutional
doctrine.” The Roberts Court’s record to date does strongly sug-
gest, however, that preemption will be an important part of its
doctrinal legacy.
One might think that the Supreme Court’s conservative wing—
which has generally pushed for broader constitutional limits on
federal power, albeit with only limited success—would be enthu-
siastic about limiting the scope of federal preemption. The actual
pattern, however, has been considerably more complex. While
some of the conservative Justices, especially Justice Thomas, have
been willing to restrict preemption, most of them have tended to
favor broad preemption of state law. The Court’s more liberal
wing, by contrast, has tended to limit preemption notwithstanding
those Justices’ aversion to constitutional limits on federal author-
ity.468 Prior to his retirement, John Paul Stevens was the Court’s
465 Todd Brewster, Will the Supreme Court Take a Historic Turn in 2012? Constitution
Daily (Dec 19, 2011), online at http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/will-the-supreme-court
-take-a-historic-turn-in-2012/. On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts turned ﬁfty-seven
this year, and by all indications he will be Chief Justice for a long time to come. It is
worth remembering, then, that the Roberts Court’s legacy may well be deﬁned by issues
that are not even on the radar screen at this early date in the Chief ’s tenure.
466 See Lyle Denniston, Political Trouble Ahead for the Supreme Court, Constitution Daily
(Dec 13, 2011), online at http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/political-trouble-ahead-for
-the-supreme-court/) (agreeing that these are the 2011 Term’s blockbusters, and observing
that “[w]hat those three controversies have most in common is this: every one of them involves
the fundamental constitutional question of how governmental power is to be divided upbetween
Washington and the states”); Arizona, Texas and Healthcare Reform (UPI.com, Dec 18, 2011),
online at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/12/18/Under-the-US-Supreme-Court-
Arizona-Texas-and-healthcare-reform/UPI-80901324197000/.
467 The Voting Rights Act, after all, preempts state authority to draw congressional
districts in certain circumstances. And although the national healthcare law permits certain
waivers in order to allow state policy experimentation, it also supplants state regulatory
authority in innumerable ways.
468 See generally Young, 83 Tex L Rev 1 (cited in note 47) (documenting and discussing
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most consistently anti-preemption Justice, notwithstanding his
consistent dissents in the Rehnquist Court’s landmark cases ex-
panding constitutional protections for state sovereignty.469
This pattern arises because preemption cases implicate a number
of cross-cutting ideological and methodological conﬂicts on the
Court. Federal preemption is generally deregulatory—that is, pre-
emption cases typically arise only where a state government has
regulated more strictly than has the national government. In Wyeth
v Levine,470 for example, the Court considered whether state tort
law could impose liability for failure to warn even where a drug’s
warning label had been approved by federal regulators. Preemp-
tion cases thus pit the deregulatory impulses of conservative
Justices against their sympathy for the states; likewise, liberals ﬁnd
themselves torn between their nationalism and their pro-regula-
tory views.471 Put another way, preemption calls into conﬂict a
libertarian form of federalism that sees federalism as a way of
limiting national regulatory power and promoting competition
among the states, with a checks-and-balances view that emphasizes
the role of states in diffusing power.472 The latter view is largely
indifferent to how states actually use their autonomy—that is,
whether they choose to regulate or deregulate.
Libertarian federalism has an honorable pedigree. It ﬁnds its
roots in Madison’s desire for a federal “negative” on unwise state
laws—a veto that, in the hands of Federalists like Madison, would
have been used to undo excessive state intervention such as the
debtor relief legislation adopted by the populist Pennsylvania leg-
islature.473 Its modern advocates stress the market-based beneﬁts
this pattern); Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Conservative Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U Chi L Rev 429 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial
Passivity, 2002 Supreme Court Review 343.
469 See, for example, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 US 525, 598 n 8 (Stevens, J,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out the irony that the ﬁve conservative
Justices who formed the majority in United States v Lopez were willing to hold that federal
law preempted state authority to regulate tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of a school).
470 555 US 555 (2009).
471 See, for example, Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption
in the Supreme Court, 89 Neb L Rev 682, 682 (2011) (“Preemption deﬁes traditional
conservative-liberal alignment, as conservatives are torn between support of federalism
and capitalist efﬁciency, and liberals are torn between support of strong national gover-
nance and multiplicity of legal remedies.”).
472 See Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy at 255–57 (cited in note 44) (de-
scribing and critiquing the libertarian model).
473 See, for example, Epstein and Greve, Introduction 6–8 (cited in note 280) (discussing
Madison’s negative).
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of competition among states to develop the most attractive poli-
cies, beneﬁts to business of avoiding excessive or conﬂicting reg-
ulation, as well as the more fundamental beneﬁt of limiting na-
tional power to intrude on the lives of individuals.474 For
libertarian federalists, however, state autonomy has no inherent
value apart from these beneﬁts, and that autonomy can be readily
sacriﬁced in circumstances where national regulation is less in-
trusive on economic liberty than is state policy.475
My own view is that the Court should resist allowing a pref-
erence for deregulatory results to inﬂuence its resolution of pre-
emption disputes. Our Constitution created an institutional struc-
ture of checks and balances; with certain relatively narrow
exceptions, it did not incorporate an inherent preference for de-
regulation.476 Moreover, it is not at all clear that courts are insti-
tutionally suited to administer a preemption doctrine predicated
on a self-conscious effort to promote economic efﬁciency.477 Such
judgments are likely to seem—and have seemed—to outside ob-
servers as though the Justices are simply enforcing their own policy
preferences. In Whiting, for example, it was hardly edifying to see
the conservative Justices who so frequently vote for preemption
switching places with the nationalists who most often oppose it,
to all appearances simply because both sides have more speciﬁc
preferences about immigration policy.
More fundamentally, even libertarian federalism ultimately pre-
supposes strong, vital state governments. Competition cannot exist
without competitors, and enfeebled states with few signiﬁcant re-
sponsibilities are unlikely to produce the sorts of innovative
choices for businesses and individuals that libertarian federalists
seek. Nor are weak states likely to check efforts to expand the
reach of federal regulation that intrudes on the autonomy of in-
dividuals, as several states have sought to do in the current health-
care litigation.478 Some attention must be paid, in other words, to
the institutional health of the states as states. And post-New Deal
474 See, for example, Untereiner, 84 Tulane L Rev at 1261–63 (cited in note 11).
475 For an incisive statement of this view, see Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Con-
stitution 7–8 (Harvard, 2012).
476 Consider Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
477 See Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy at 255–56 (cited in note 44).
478 See Young, Popular Constitutionalism (cited in note 127) (discussing how federalism-
based limits on Congress’s power provide breathing space for more expansive views of
economic liberty that current federal constitutional doctrine may not support).
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constitutional doctrine is quickly running out of options for pro-
tecting federalism. The Commerce Clause is largely dead, the
Spending Clause is practically nonjusticiable, the Eleventh
Amendment is generally unhelpful to state autonomy, and the anti-
commandeering doctrine is very narrow and subject to ready cir-
cumvention under the Spending Clause. In other words, the pre-
sumption against preemption may be the last best hope for
preserving a meaningful measure of state autonomy in our con-
stitutional system.
The preemption cases of the 2010 Term reveal a Court that has
still not made up its mind about preemption but perhaps one that
is asking increasingly basic questions about preemption and its
relation to other constitutional issues. The more that the Justices
see preemption cases as not simply disputes about the scope of
federal and state regulation under speciﬁc regulatory statutes, but
rather as raising fundamental questions of federalism, the more
likely they are to transcend the current divide between proponents
and opponents of regulation. Their ability to do so will be, in
Justice Breyer’s phrase, “the true test of federalist principle.”479
479 Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 532 US 141, 160–61 (2001).
